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FUNCTIONALLY RESTRICTIVE
SUBSTANTIVE RULES IN AMERICAN
CONFLICTS LAW
ROBERT ALLEN SEDLER*
On the whole, recent American conflicts theory has been little concerned with
developments elsewhere, such as on the Continent or in England and the
Commonwealth countries. With few exceptions, American commentators
generally have not attempted to relate American conflicts doctrine to the
international dimensions of the subject.I It has almost been as if foreign
conflicts doctrine is an aspect of comparative law, interesting perhaps, but
better left to those whose special interest is in that area, while the rest of us
concentrate entirely on the "veritable revolution" that has occurred on this
side of the Atlantic.2 The American legal community's lack of interest in
foreign conflicts doctrine and developments elsewhere, however, is not
reciprocal. Foreign conflicts scholars have paid very careful attention to what
has been happening here, although frequently viewing it with great alarm.
3
Much can be learned from an understanding of foreign conflicts doctrine
and from the ways that other legal systems deal with conflicts problems.
These problems, although arising in different contexts, are necessarily
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; Visiting Professor of Law, Cornell Law
School, 1976-1977. A.B. 1956, J.D. 1959, University of Pittsburgh.
1. The most notable exception, of course, was the late Albert Ehrenzweig. This appears
most clearly in his work, A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISEONTHE CONFLiCrOF LAWS (1962). His later
works, A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: GENERAL PART (1967), and A. EHRENZ-
wEIG & E. JAYME, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: SPECIAL PART (1973), approach the subject
from the international rather than from the American cpntext. See also Ehrenzweig, Specific
Principles of PRivate Transnational Law, 2 HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, RECUEIL
DES COURS [RECUEIL DES COURS] 1968, at 167 (1969).
2. This is not meant to suggest that other commentators have not paid attention to
developments elsewhere or have not participated in the "international discourse." See, e.g., von
Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927 (1975). But
those who have are a distinct minority, and most writings about the conflict of laws in this country
are clearly "inward looking."
3. See, e.g., 3 E. VrrTA, DIRrrTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIvATo 502 et seq. (1975); G. Kegel,
The Crisis of Conflict of Laws, I RECUEIL DES COURS 1964, at 91, 163 et seq. (1965). See also
Juenger, Trends in European Conflicts Law, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 969, 970-72 (1975) (concerning
the interest of foreign scholars in American developments).
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universal, and the theories and approaches for their solution, although again
frequently developed with reference to the context in which they arise in
particular legal systems, 4 may provide useful insights into the solution of
conflicts problems that arise in another context. Thus, an understanding of
conflicts doctrine and the approaches to the choice-of-law problem that have
been developed elsewhere, particularly on the Continent and in England and
the Commonwealth countries, 5 may have considerable utility in the struggle
to find the "best solution" for the problems that arise here.
But precisely because the context in which American conflicts problems
arise is very different from the context in which they arise on the Continent or
in England and the Commonwealth countries, the utility of foreign conflicts
doctrines and approaches depends on their adaptability to American prob-
lems. It appears that certain doctrines, concepts, approaches, and the like that
have been developed and recognized elsewhere may be adapted for use in the
American context, though perhaps serving a different function here than they
do within the framework of another legal system.
In this regard, there are two very important contextual differences that
constantly must be kept in mind when drawing on foreign conflicts doctrine
and theory for use in the American system. 6 In the first place, the overwhelm-
ing majority of choice-of-law cases that come before American courts are
interstate in character, involving a question of choice-of-law between Ameri-
can states7 or between the laws of an American state and a Canadian province,
which is not an appreciably different situation. 8 While there may be disagree-
4. As De Nova has pointed out, "[gleneral theories on private international law may
sometimes be as much induced, or at least influenced, by the peculiarities of a national legal order
as the specific conflicts rules that belong to it." De Nova, Historical and Comparative
Introduction to Conflict of Laws, 2 RECUEIL DES COURS 1966, at 441, 595 (1965). In De Nova's
view, the "current debates" on conflicts law in this country find their roots in the legal realism
movement of the 1930's. Id.
5. It is interesting to recall that American ideas about the conflict of laws historically
developed from the Continent because of the absence of a "received" conflicts law from
England. See Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson inKentucky: Judicial Method and the Policy.Centered
Conflict of Laws, 56 KY. L.J. 27,34-35 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in
Kentucky].
6. In the area of jurisdiction and recognition of judgments, foreign doctrine may also
provide some useful insights with regard to those matters that are not controlled by constitutional
considerations. See, e.g., A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONELICT OF LAWS §§ 11-33 (1962);
Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS
LAW 321 (K. Nadelmann, A. von Mehren & J. Hazard eds. 1961).
7. The term "state of the Union" is used to refer to an American state or territory,
distinguishing it from the broader use of the term "state" for conflicts purposes.
8. This is because of the common language, similar culture, interdependent economies,
and, with the exception of Quebec (which, for these purposes, can be compared to Louisiana),
similar legal systems. These considerations are not present when the conflict is between the law
of an American state and a Mexican state. Such cases should be, and -are, viewed as truly
international ones. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Autobuses Blancos Flecha Roja, S.A. de C.V., 486 F.2d
493 (5th Cir. 1973).
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ment whether truly inteinational cases require essentially different treatment
than interstate ones for choice-of-law purposes, 9 it is clear that different
treatment has not been accorded in practice. 10 Likewise there can be little
doubt that modem American theories and approaches to the choice-of-law
problem have been developed almost entirely with reference to interstate
choice-of-law. '
Second, a clear majority of American courts have now abandoned the
traditional approach of broad, state-selecting choice-of-law rules embodied in
the first Restatement of the Conflict of Laws in favor of more flexible, arid to
one degree or another, policy-centered approaches.' 2 Elsewhere, however,
the approach, both academically and in practice, is still one of broad,
state-selecting choice-of-law rules.13 Policy considerations come in only'as a
9. Compare Ehrenzweig, Interstate and International Conflicts Law: A Plea for Segrega-
tion, 41 MINN. L. REV. 717 (1957), with Scoles, Interstate and International Distinctions in
Conflict of Laws in the United States, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1599 (1966).
10. See Hay, International Versus Interstate Conflicts Law in the United States, 35 RABELS
ZErrSCHRIFr 429 (1971).
11. Elsewhere these are referred to as interlocal conflicts;and special doctrines have been
developed to deal with them in the structure of a system that ordinarily deals with international
conflicts. See, e.g., Graveson, Problems of Private International Law in Non-Unified Legal
Systems, 1 RECUEIL DES COURS 1974, at 195 (1975); Kahn-Freund, General Problems of Private
International Law, 3 RECUEIL DES COURS 1974, at 147, 293-329 (1975).
This is very desirable, since the problem of interstate choice-of-law between different
American states is an integral part of federalism and must be approached from that perspective,
see Sedler, Book Review, - J. LEGAL ED. - (1977), as well as with reference to the "realities" of
interstate life. This requires a recognition that people live and act within functional,
socioeconomic, and mobility areas, so that undue weight should not be given to the existence of a
state line. See generally Sedler, The Territorial Imperative: Automobile Accidents and the
Significance of a State Line, 9 DUQUESNE L. REV. 394 (1971). Moreover, insofar as choice-of-law
decisions are made with reference to considerations of policy and fairness to the parties, proper
account can be taken of the international dimension of a case when this may necessitate a
different analysis of the relevant policies and considerations of fairness. See Scoles, Interstate
and International Distinctions in Conflict of Laws in the United States, 54 CALIF. L. Rv. 1599,
1600-02 (1966). As to its recognition in regard to the validity of forum-selection clauses, see The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11-15 (1972).
12. The use of the term "policy-centered" refers to the making of the choice-of-law
decision with reference to considerations of policy and fairness to the parties, and is intended to
encompass the particular methodologies developed by various policy-centered theorists. See
Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 5, at 57-60. It should be added that the author
does not consider the "modern rules approach" of the, Restatement Second to be a "policy-
centered" one. See id, at 61-63. Courts, however, often cite the Restatement Secondin support of
the essentially policy-centered solutions that they have adopted in the particular case. For a
listing of the states that in recent years have still adhered to the traditional approach, see R.
CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 247-48 (2d ed. 1975).
13. Not infrequently these rules are specifically contained in continental codes. And even
when the rules are stated in unilateral form, i.e., when they only purport to prescribe the
applicability of the forum's own law, the courts have interpreted them bilaterally to constitute
general choice-of-law rules. See De Nova, Historical and Comparative Introduction to Conflict
of Laws, 2 RECUEIL DES COURS 1966, at 441, 572-76 (1967); Ehrenzweig, Specific Principles of
Private Transnational Law, 2 RECUEIL DES COURS 1968, at 167, 220-21 (1969).
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limited exception to those rules by way of public policy, imperative laws, and
the like. 14 As has been observed, on the Continent the dominant attitude is still
formalistic and system-minded, as opposed to the "prevalent pragmatism of
the American jurisprudence and living law."'
15
Recognition of these differences, however, should not obscure the fact
that conflicts problems are necessarily universal, and that all legal systems
deal with the same basic problem, the problem of how "the [international]
legal order also involves integration of the diversity of laws of which it is
composed." 16 Since this is so, it would seem almost axiomatic that doctrines
and theory developed within one context may, when the contextual differ-
ences are properly understood, be adapted for use in another context. )
7
One concept in particular has been developed by continental, English,
and Commonwealth commentators, which has received little attention here,
but which can be adapted to the American context. It is a concept developed to
describe a phenomenon that necessarily erists in all legal systems. Because its
significance has generally been overlooked here, however, the concept has
not yet received a name. 18 This is the concept of functionally restrictive
substantive rules. This Article attempts to explain the phenomenon to which it
refers and to demonstrate its utility in clarifying the question "Is there a
conflict of laws?"
14. See generally Eek, Peremptory Norms and Private International Law, 2 RECUEIL DES
COURS 1973, at 9 (1974).
15. De Nova, Historical and Comparative Introduction to Conflict ofLawvs, 2 RECUEIL DES
COURS 1966, at 441, 595 (1967).
16. Yntema, The HistoricBases of Private InternationalLaw, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 297 (1953).
17. Although I had been interested for some time in exploring this question, I did not do so
in any systematic way-despite the fact that a great deal of writing on continental conflicts law is
available in English-until I took a sabbatical in the fall of 1975 and went to Italy "where it all
began." See Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 5, at 30-33. There, thanks to the
kindness of Professor Rodolfo De Nova of the University of Pavia, who has long been interested
in American conflicts law and in the works of American commentators, and of his colleague,
Professor Franco Mosconi, I was able to undertake at least a preliminary study of continental
conflicts doctrine and theory. Because of my limited language facility, most of my research was
restricted to works that were written in English. As indicated by the citations in this Article, I
found particularly useful the collected courses of the Hague Academy of International Law,
which are published in either English or French in the Recueil des Cours. In addition there are
numerous works published by foreign scholars in English. To use what the French would
consider to be a horrible play on words, it is not inaccurate to say today that English is the lingua
Franca of private international law. During the latter part of my stay I finally was able to acquire a
sufficient reading knowledge of Italian so that I could-with the help of an unabridged Italian-
English dictionary-read some works in Italian. Of course, the opportunity to discuss the subject
at length with Professors De Nova and Mosconi contributed.greatly to my understanding. At this
point I feel that I have at least a basic understanding of continental conflicts doctrine and of the
approaches that are taken to the resolution of choice-of-law problems there. At the same time, I
delved more deeply than I previously had into the conflicts law and doctrine of England and the
Commonwealth countries.
18. It is only after a phenomenon has been given a name that it can be treated as a concept
and used for legal analysis.
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I. FUNCTIONALLY RESTRICTIVE SUBSTANTIVE RULES
Professor De Nova 19 of the University of Pavia defines functionally restrictive
substantive rules as
legal rules which, be it through additional, specific provisions or
through construction of the rules themselves in light of their
underlying policies, are endowed with a direct or indirect indication
of the conflictual situations they are meant to cover.2 0
Another definition, given by David St. L. Kelly, Reader in Law at the
University of Adelaide, who has recently published a comprehensive mono-
graph on the subject,21 is
rules whose sole function is to limit the application of the substan-
tive laws which they qualify to certain persons, events or transac-
tions connected in a specified way with the State of whose law they
form part.
22
Professor David Cavers, one of the few American commentators who has
discussed the concept at all, 23 uses the term "legislatively localized laws,"
24
which he defines as
substantive laws of the enacting state which are limited by their
terms either (1) to certain events or transactions within the enacting
state or (2) to certain persons connected with that state in specified
ways, even though the acts or events involving them occur outside
the state. .... 25
19. De Nova has long been interested in this concept. See, e.g., DeNova, Self-Limiting
Rules and Party Autonomy, 5 ADELAIDE L. REV. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as De Nova,
Self-Limiting Rules]; De Nova, Conflict of Laws and Functionally Restricted Substantive Rules,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1569 (1966) [hereinafter cited as De Nova, Conflict of Laws]; De Nova, I
Conflitti de Leggi e le Norme con Apposita Delimitazione della Sfera di Efficacia, 13 DIRITrO
INTERNAZIONALE 13 (1959); De Nova, An Australian Case on the Application of Spatially
Conditioned Internal Rules, 22 REVUE HELLNIQUE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 24 (1969).
20. De Nova, Forewordto D. ST. L. KELLY, LOCALISING RULES INTHE CONFLICrOF LAWS
at XV (1974) [hereinafter cited as D. ST. L. KELLY].
21. Mr. Kelly's initial work on the subject, which was expanded and revised in the
monograph, is Localising Rules and Differing Approaches to the Choice of Law Process, 18 INT.
& Comp. L.Q. 249 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Localising Rules]. On the assumption that the
monograph may not be readily accessible in this country, the earlier article is cited wherever
possible.
22. Localising Rules, supra note 21, at 249. See also Kahn-Freund, General Problems of
Private International Law, 3 RECUEIL DES COrRS 1974, at 147, 239-43 (1975).
23. See D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS 225-49 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
CAVERS]. Another work on the subject, by a then-student of Professor Cavers, is Danson,
Territorially Limited Statutes and the-Choice-of-law Process, 1 HARV. J. LEGIS. 115 (1964). See
also Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective, 3 RECUEIL DES COURs 1970,
at 85, 133-35 (1971) [hereinafter cited as American Perspective].
24. CAVERS, supra note 23, at 225-26.
25. Id. at 226. This makes it clear that he does not see them as necessarily being "spatially
conditioned internal rules," which was the term used by Professor Nussbaum, who also briefly
considered them. A. NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 71 (1943). The
latter term is also used in Lipstein, Conflict of Laws 1921-1971: The Way Ahead, 31 CAMB. L.J.
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While these definitions may differ somewhat, the underlying theme is that of
self-limitation, and the essential characteristic of the concept of functionally
restrictive substantive rules is that of limitations on the applicability of a rule
of substantive law that inhere within the substantive rule itself. The concept
exists totally apart from choice-of-law considerations, and the rule to which it
refers is a rule of substantive law only. When it is said that a law constitutes a
functionally restrictive substantive rule, 26 it means that the law is by its own
force inapplicable to certain situations containing a foreign element.
This Article will first consider the operation of the concept of function-
ally restrictive substantive rules Within the context of legal systems that have
adopted a rule-oriented approach to choice of law, and then discuss its utility
in the American context in clarifying the question "Is there a conflict of
laws?"
II. FUNCTIONALLY RESTRICTIVE SUBSTANTIVE RULES
AND RULE-ORIENTED CHOICE-OF-LAW
A. OPERATION OF FUNCTIONALLY RESTRICTIVE SUBSTANTIVE RULES IN
RULE-ORIENTED CHOICE-OF-LAW SYSTEMS
The significance of the concept of functionally restrictive substantive rules
within the framework of a rule-oriented approach to choice-of-law is that it
represents an exception to the ordinary choice-of-law process and prevents
the application of a particular rule of substantive law of the state chosen by the
forum's choice-of-law rule. As De Nova describes it, "[the concept] intends
to override the normal conflict of laws rules and. . . has made its own choice
of law." 27 The clearest example of a functionally restrictive substantive rule
is a statute that contains a provision expressly excluding its application to
certain situations containing a foreign element. For example, section 1 of the
English Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 192428 expressly provides that it
shall apply only to outward shipments from a port in Great Britain or Northern
Ireland to another port whether in or outside Great Britain or Northern
Ireland, so that, by its own terms, it is inapplicable to inward shipments. 29
67, 71-77 (1972); Lipstein, The General Principles of Private International Law, I RECUEIL DES
CouRs 1972, at 135, 204-06 (1973).
26. This necessarily refers to those substantive law rules that are embodied in statutes. See
Prebble, Choice of Law to Determine the Validity and Effect of Contracts: A Comparison of
English and American Approaches to the Conflict of Laws, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 635, 713 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Prebble].
27. De Nova, An Australian Case on the Application of Spatially Conditioned Internal
Rules, 22 REVUE HELLINIQUE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL 24, 29 (1969).
28. 14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 22. The Act was prospectively repealed by the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act of 1971, c. 19.
29. This is the most obvious application of the expressio unius principle, since there are
only two possible categories, inward and outward shipments, and the act refers only to outward
shipments.
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Thus, in a case involving an inward shipment to Great Britain or Northern
Ireland, even though English law is applicable as the "proper law of the
contract," the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act cannot be applied. 30 Within the
framework of a rule-oriented approach to choice of law, however, the
concept of functionally restrictive substantive rules is not limited to the
situation where the statute expressly contains a restrictive provision. It applies
wherever the court, in light of the legislative purpose behind the statute, finds
such a built-in limitation. Consider three "classic" cases that commentators
have used to illustrate this concept. In Mount Albert Borough Council v.
Australasian T. & G. Mutual Life Assurance Society, Ltd.,31 a New Zealand
borough council borrowed money for a public works project from a life
insurance company, which was incorporated in Victoria, Australia, but which
carried on business in both Australia and New Zealand. As security for the
loan the council issued debentures, secured by a special rate on the taxable
value of all taxable property of the borough, which were payable in Victoria.
Subsequently the Victorian Parliament enacted the Financial Emergency Act
of 1931, which provided for the compulsory reduction of interest payments on
mortgages, including those due on debentures issued by local authorities.
32
When the New Zealand borough council sought to take advantage of the
reduced rate provided by the statute it was unsuccessful. The Privy Council
held that the provisions of the statute were inapplicable, since
a careful consideration of the terms of the sections. . . shows that,
though the general definition of mortgage. . . is wide enough to
cover any mortgage of any land anywhere in the world, the inten-
tion of the Acts is to limit it to Victorian mortgages.
33
Since the only way that the interest payments could have been reduced was
under the provisions of the Victorian statute, once the court found it was by its
own force inapplicable-that it constituted a functionally restrictive substan-
tive rule-there was no choice-of-law problem in the case because under the
common law rule, prevailing both in New Zealand and Victoria, the borrower
was liable to pay the agreed-upon rate of interest.34
In Kay's Leasing Corp. Proprietary Ltd. v. Fletcher,35 residents of New
South Wales entered into a hire-purchase agreement in Victoria with a
company that was incorporated and had its principal place of business there.
30. See Localising Rules, supra note 21, at 257-58. As to the substantive rule of English law
that does apply when England is the "proper law of the contract," see notes 45-46 and
accompanying text infra. For examples of other English statutes containing such limitations, see
Lipstein, Conflict of Laws 1921-1971: The Way Ahead, 31 CAMB. L.J. 67, 72 n.42 (1972).
31. [1938] A.C. 224 (P.C. 1937).
32. Id. at 225-26.
33. Id. at 243.
34. When the statute was found to be inapplicable, Victoria's common law rule necessarily
applied. See notes 45-46 and accompanying text infra.
35. 116 Commw. L.R. 124 (Austl. 1964).
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The agreement related to a tractor which the purchasers were to use for their
business in New South Wales, and contained an express choice-of-law
provision in favor of Victorian law. When the purchasers defaulted, they were
sued in New South Wales, and set up as defenses (1) that the transaction was
usurious under the New South Wales Hire-Purchase Agreements Act and (2)
that the company had not obtained a deposit as required by that statute. The
agreement was also invalid under the Victoria Hire-Purchase Act, but with
consequences less favorable to the purchasers. 36 The High Court of Australia
held that the New South Wales statute was inapplicable to contracts executed
in another state.37 Thus, the purchasers could not claim its benefits, and since
apparently, as in the previous example, the same result would have been
reached under the Victoria statute and the rule of New South Wales that
applied in the absence of the statute,38 it was not necessary to decide which
law governed.
The third illustrative case, Sayers v. International Drilling Co. N. V.,39
involved the validity of a clause in an employment contract executed in
England by a Dutch company and an Englishman, under which the employee
agreed to accept the company's death and disability compensation program in
lieu of any other remedies for injury suffered during the course of employ-
ment outside the United Kingdom. 40 The liability-limiting clause in the
contract would have been invalid under English law, but the Court of Appeal
held that Dutch law was the "proper law of the contract." '41 While a provision
of the Dutch Civil Code invalidated such clauses in the same manner as
English law, the court accepted the testimony of an expert on Dutch law to the
effect that the Dutch courts would hold this provision of the Civil Code
inapplicable to contracts such as this, which were considered international
contracts under Dutch law, and would treat the liability-limiting clause as
valid. The Dutch code provision invalidating such clauses was, therefore,
interpreted as containing a functionally restrictive limitation-it was inap-
plicable to international contracts-and the English court applied the rule of
Dutch law that the Dutch courts would hold applicable to this case.
42
36. The facts are set out in id. at 131-34. The summary of the case is taken from De Nova,
An Australian Case on the Application of Spatially Conditioned Internal Rules, 22 REvuE
HELLANIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 24, 24-25 (1969).
37. 116 Commw. L.R. at 134-35.
38. It was stipulated by the parties that this result would obtain. Id. at 134.
39. [1971] 3 ALL E.R. 163 (C.A.).
40. The accident occurred in Nigeria. If it had occurred in England, the contractual
provisions would by their own terms have been inapplicable. Id. at 165-66.
41. Id. at 166-67.
42. De Nova questions this interpretation of Dutch law. But since there was no cross-
examination and no evidence introduced by the pliantiff on this point, the trial judge had to accept
the testimony of the Dutch lawyer. De Nova, Self-Limiting Rules, supra note 19, at 10-12.
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As these examples indicate, in a system that follows a rule-oriented
approach to choice-of-law, the concept of functionally restrictive substantive
rules serves two functions. First, in cases such as Mount AlbertBorough and
Kay's Leasing, the interpretation of the purportedly applicable statute of one
of the involved states as constituting a functionally restrictive substantive rule
avoided the necessity for a choice-of-law decision since the law of that state
which was applicable in the absence of the statute did not differ in result from
the law of the other involved state. Second, in Sayers, where the concept of
functionally restrictive substantive rules was not relevant until after the forum
had made a choice-of-law decision which looked to the law of another state,
recognition of that concept meant that the forum was applying the substantive
rule of the state chosen by its choice-of-law rule which that state would itself
have applied if the case had come before it. 43 In that situation the concept
serves the function of "finding within the 'competent' foreign law, the
correct rules of decision." 4 In regard to both functions, it constitutes an
exception to the ordinary choice-of-law process, since the application of the
substantive rule is restricted by limitations contained within the rule itself
instead of by choice-of-law rules, and analytically, at least, apart from
choice-of-law considerations.
When a purportedly applicable statute or code provision of one or both of
the involved states45 is construed as constituting a functionally restrictive
substantive rule, the general law of that state takes over to supply the rule of
decision should that state's substantive law be held to govern. When a statute
is inapplicable.in common law countries, as in the non-conflicts situation,
where the events in question occurred before the effective date of the statute,
or in the conflicts situation, where the statute is construed as constituting a
functionally restrictive substantive rule, the common law rule is applicable to
the decision of the case. In Mount Albert Borough, for example, once the
Victoria Financial Emergency Act was found to be inapplicable, the common
law rule of Victoria, under which the borrower had to pay the agreed-upon
rate of interest, was applicable. Since the same common law rule prevailed in
New Zealand there was no conflict between the applicable laws of the
involved states.46 Similarly, whenever a statute or specific provision of the
43. If the purportedly applicable provision of the Dutch code had not been interpreted as
constituting a functionally restrictive substantive rule, however, there would have been no
conflict between English and Dutch law on the question whether the contractual provision was
invalid.
44. De Nova, Conflict ofLaws, supra note 19, at 1571. It serves the same function when the
forum's own substantive law is chosen under its choice-of-law rule.
45. The examples are limited to a "two-state" conflict.
46. In Kay's Leasing, only the New South Wales Act gave the purchasers the right to
recover what they had already paid to the seller, which was the point in issue, since the parties had
agreed that under either Victoria or New South Wales law the underlying transaction was invalid
and would subject the borrower to no further liability.
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code is held inapplicable, civil law countries look to the lex generalis-the
general provisions of the code-for the rule of decision. In Sayers, for
example, once the court held the specific provision of the code inapplicable to
international contracts, interpretation of the contract in question was gov-
erned by the general provisions of the code recognizing the validity of
contractual arrangements that were not specifically prohibited.
According to the commentators, however, there could exist a gap when
the law of the state chosen by the forum's choice-of-law rules, the lex causae,
contains a functionally restrictive substantive rule which, if applied, would
leave "no substantive rules in the foreign law with which to dispose of the
case." 4 7 This will create no problem if the forum is willing to accept the
renvoi where the choice-of-law rule of the lex causae refers the case back to
the forum, or if it is willing to apply its own law on the basis of desistment or
"non-choice.'"48 But if it is unwilling to do this, the forum must ignore the
functionally restrictive nature of the applicable rule of the lex causae, and
apply that state's "domestic law," i.e., the law which would be applicable in
a purely domestic case. 49 Kelly uses the example of a state such as England (or
an American state) which refers to the lex domicliji to govern succession and
finds that the lex causae, whose own choice-of-law rule looks instead to the
lex patriae, also has a functionally restrictive substantive rule that limits the
provisions of its succession law only to its nationals or to foreign nationals
"habitually resident" there. 50 If the deceased is domiciled in that country
under England's concept of domicile, but is "habitually resident" elsewhere,
"there are no substantive rules in the foreign law with which to dispose of the
case."'" If England is unwilling to apply its own law,52 it must ignore the
functionally restrictive aspect of the lex causae. But, as this example
indicates, such a case will be rather fare, and ordinarily when the law of the
state chosen by the forum's choice-of-law rules contains a functionally
restrictive substantive rule, the forum can look to the other state's general law
to avoid the gap problem.
53
47. Localising Rules, supra note 21, at 267.
48.. Id. at 268.
49. Id. at 270. De Nova, who argues that generally the forum should accept the functionally
restrictive interpretation that the lex causae puts upon its oWn law, concedes that in this situation
it'must apply the "domestic law." De Nova, Self-Limiting Rules, supra note 19, at 7-8.
50. Localising Rules, supra note 21, at 266-67.
51. Id. at 267.
52. But under England's "foreign court" approach to the renvol, if the other state would
not decide the case in accordance with its own law, i.e., if it would reject the renvoi, England
would "accept" the reference back and apply English law. In re Ross, [1930] 1 Ch. 377.
53. It has also been a matter of some debate whether an express choice-of-law should be
construed as including the functionally restrictive aspect of the chosen law. Compare Prebble,
supra note 26, at 719, with De Nova, Self-Limiting Rules, supra note 19, at 4-8. See also
Adamastos Shipping Co. v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co., [1959] A.C. 133 (1958). Where the issue
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Finally, it is important in the context of a rule-oriented approach to
choice-of-law to distinguish the concept of functionally restrictive substan-
tive rules from the concept of the renvoi. In those systems that reject the
renvol,54 it may be asked whether recognition of the concept of functionally
restrictive substantive rules puts the forum in the same position as if it were
accepting the renvoi, since it would be taking account of a limitation
contained in the law of the state chosen by the forum's choice-of-law rule.
As De Nova points out, however, this is not so, because in recognizing the
concept of functionally restrictive substantive rules the forum is not looking to
the choice-of-law rules of another state-which is the essence of renvo--but
is "simply applying that substantive rule of the competent legal order which
does fit the facts of the given case-as those facts are seen by that legal
order." 55 In any event, recognition of the functionally restrictive nature of a
rule of substantive law does not give rise to the problem of "reference back"
and similar problems associated with the renvoi. Thus, structurally at least,
there would be no inconsistency between a court's rejection of the renvoi and
its willingness to accept the concept of functionally restrictive substantive
rules.
B. INTRODUCTION OF POLICY ANALYSIS INA RULE-ORIENTED
CHOICE-OF-LAW SYSTEM
Significantly, recognition of the concept of functionally restrictive substan-
tive rules within the framework of a rule-oriented approach to choice-of-law
introduces policy considerations into the choice-of-law process by way of the
"back door." This has an impact potentially far more sweeping than any of
the other "policy exceptions" that have been traditionally recognized. As
Kelly has pointed out, since few statutes contain express "localising rules,"
56
involves a matter beyond the contractural capacity of the parties, the express choice-of-law
should be deemed to refer to the applicable substantive law of the chosen state, much in the same
manner as the law of the chosen state should apply even if it would invalidate the contract. See
Sedler, The Contracts Provisions of the Restatement (Second): An Analysis and a Critique, 72
COLUM. L. Rev. 279, 292-94 (1972).
54. Most European countries have declared themselves on the subject one way or another
either by code provision or by consistent judicial practice. For this reason the English courts have
been able to employ the "foreign court" approach, accepting the reference back only if the court
of the lex causae would not do so. See In re Ross, [1930] 1 Ch. 377; In reAnnesley, [1926] 1 Ch.
692.
55. De Nova, Conflict of Laws, supra note 19, at 1570. Prebble, to the contrary, maintains
that the distinction is untenable because "[e]ach type of rule, has, as part of its function, the task
of determining whether certain rules of domestic law apply to the case at hand." Prebble, supra
note 26, at 717. De Nova replies: "[b]ut this is simply not true of localizing rules: their only
function is to affect domestic rules, whereas general rules of the conflict of laws-provided they
are taken to act bilaterally, as Mr. Prebble also supposes--do have a further function ...,
namely to makeforeign rules applicable." De Nova, Self-LimitingRules, supranote 19, at 6-7 n.19
(emphasis in original).
56. This is Kelly's terminology.
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their applicability (once the concept of functionally restrictive substantive
rules is fully recognized) must be determined "either ab extra by a set of rules
'superior' to the relevant state's decisional rules, or from within the rules
themselves, as a matter of their construction and interpretation." 57 Likewise,
his analysis of the criteria that must be employed to determine the territorial
extension of substantive law rules looks to whether the object of the statute
will thereby be significantly furthered.58 Thus,
once localising rules of the lex causae59 are treated as part of the
domestic law of the system of which they form part, a major step
has been taken towards adopting a functional or interest approach
towards the solution of conflict problems.'
And indeed it has. The similarity between determining the functionally
restrictive character of a substantive rule with reference to its underlying
purpose, as a matter of construction and intepretation, and applying Brainerd
Currie's methodology of interest analysis to the solution of choice-of-law
problems is too obvious to be accidental, 61 and Kelly does not suggest that it
is. 62 This similarity is further illustrated by De Nova's analysis of Kaufman v.
American Youth Hostels, Inc.,63 in which he explicitly draws on Currie to
show how substantive rules can be given a functionally restrictive interpreta-
tion. In that case the decedent, a resident of New York, was killed in Oregon
during a mountain climbing expedition conducted by the defendant, a New
York eleemosynary institution which apparently was not "doing business" in
Oregon. Oregon recognized charitable immunity at that time; New York did
not. The New York court, applying the traditional choice-of-law rule that
liability for tort was governed by the law of the "place of wrong," looked to
Oregon law and sustained the defense. Currie, of course, saw the case in
terms of interest analysis as presenting the classic false conflict. New York's
policy was to protect victims against torts for which charitable corporations
were responsible. It had an interest in applying that policy to hold a New
York charity liable for the death of a New York victim notwithstanding that
57. D. ST. L. KELLY, supra note 20, at 78.
58. Id. at 84-85.
59. This refers to the laws of the state chosen by the forum's choice-of-law rule, but, for
these purposes, would include the forum itself when it is the "chosen state."
60. Localising Rules, supra note 21, at 274.
61. See generally B. CURIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS (1963). The
approach is summarized in R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLicr OF LAWS 221-24 (2d
ed. 1975).
62. D. ST. L. KELLY, supra note 20, at 84-95. As he notes particularly:
It is to the intrinsic policy of the latter [decisional rule] that prime importance must
normally be attached for it is by reference to the object of the decisional rule that it is
often possible to determine whether personal or territorial factors are the overriding
ones.
Id. at 90-91.
63. 6 App. Div. 2d 223, 177 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1958), modified on other grounds and aff'd, 5
N.Y.2d 1016, 158 N.E.2d 128, 185 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1959).
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the fatal accident occurred in Oregon. Since Oregon was presumably
interested only in protecting charities that carried on their "good works" in
Oregon, the policy behind Oregon's grant of charitable immunity would not
be served by applying it to a New York charity that did not carry on "good
works" in Oregon. Therefore, the law of New York, as the law of the only
interested state, should have been applied, and the defense not allowed.
De Nova uses Currie's analysis and relates it to the concept of function-
ally restrictive substantive rules to show that the result that Currie
advocates-the rejection of the defense-' 'is also supported by Oregon law if
only it had been correctly applied.' "6 The applicable Oregon law, according
to De Nova, was not its rule protecting charitable enterprises, but was its more
general policy of protecting and indemnifying the victims of tortious conduct.
This is because Oregon's rule of charitable immunity was not meant for the
protection of foreign charities, 65 so that as to those charities, Oregon's general
policy regarding accident victims came into play. While New York was
looking to Oregon law under its choice-of-law rule-the issue was liability in
tort, and both the wrongful conduct and the injury occurred in Oregon-New
York "either disregarded or misunderstood the interplay of Oregon's sub-
stantive rules in giving an unjustified prominence of the exceptional immun-
ity rule over the basic policy on tortious responsibility.''66 Since the same
general policy was part of New York law, the case did not present a conflict of
laws at all. It was "superfluous to choose between the substantive rules in
point belonging to the legal systems concerned. "67
Just as Currie looks to the policy behind the Oregon rule of charitable
immunity to determine whether it has an interest in applying its rule to a case
containing a foreign element, and concludes that it does not, De Nova looks to
the same policy to determine whether the rule should be given a functionally
restrictive interpretation so as to make it inapplicable in a case containing a
foreign element. De Nova concludes that it should be so restricted for the
same reasons as does Currie, i.e., the rule's underlying policy will be
advanced only when it is applied to corporations carrying on their "good
works" in Oregon. Thus, recognition of the concept of functionally restric-
tive substantive rules within the framework of a rule-oriented approach to
choice-of-law produces the same result here-the denial of the defense of
64. De Nova, Conflict of Laws, supra note 19, at 1572.
65. As Kelly notes, the statute should not be applied when "the object of the statute will
not be significantly furthered." He refers to this as the "mischief approach." D. ST. L. KELLY,
supra note 20, at 84-85.
66. De Nova, Conflict of Laws, supra note 19, at 1572 (emphasis in original).
67. Id. (emphasis in-original). Recognition of the concept of functionally restrictive
substantive rules enabled the court to avoid such a "superfluous" choice-of-law in MountAlbert
Borough and Kay's Leasing.
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charitable immunity based on Oregon law to the New York charity that does
not carry on its "good-works" in Oregon-as does the interest analysis
approach which is premised entirely on the rejection of choice-of-law rules.
68
To the extent that the concept of functionally restrictive substantive rules
becomes fully recognized within the framework of a rule-oriented approach
to choice-of-law, considerations of policy will come in "by the back door,"
and may convert the system, in no small part, to one adopting a "functional or
interest approach to the solution of conflicts problems.''69 The future
development of this concept on the Continent and in England and the
Commonwealth countries should be of considerable interest to American
commentators.
III. FUNCTIONALLY RESTRICTIVE SUBSTANTIVE RULES
IN THE AMERICAN CONTEXT:
"IS THERE A CONFLICT OF LAWS?"
In light of the above discussion of the function-and pqtential approach-
altering significance-of the concept of functionally restrictive substantive
rules in legal systems that employ a rule-oriented approach to choice-of-law,
what is the relevance of this concept in the American context, where a
policy-centered approach has already been adopted, in one form or another,
by the great majority of courts? Certainly it cannot be to bring in policy
considerations "by the back door" in those jurisdictions that still adhere to
the broad, state-selecting choice-of-law rules of the traditional approach. A
direct attack on the traditional approach would seem to promise more success.
More importantly, precisely because the great majority of American states
have abandoned the traditional approach, consideration of the policy behind
the particular substantive law rules of both the forum and of the other involved
states is now an integral part of the choice-of-law process, which is recog-
nized as a choice between laws rather than as a choice between states. 70 As
one commentator has stated, in the United States the question of recognition
of the concept of functionally restrictive substantive rules "has been over-
taken by events-namely the victory of interest analysis." 71 Nonetheless, the
68. Currie himself concluded that there was utility in a legislature's "[s]pecifying in
realistic terms the cases to which its enactment is intended to apply." B. CURRIE, SELECTED
EsSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 116 (1963).
69. Localising Rules, supra note 21, at 274.
70. As Professor Reese has observed,
[a]midst the chaos and tumult of choice of law there is at least one point on which there
seems to be general agreement in the United States. This is that choice of the applicable
law should frequently depend upon the issue involved. The search in these instances is
not for the state whose law will be applied to govern all issues in a case; rather it is for
the rule of law that can most appropriately be applied to govern the particular issue.
Reese, Dipegage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 58 (1973).
71. Prebble, supra note 26, at 715. Strictly speaking, the victory is of the policy-centered
approach in general, although in practice the emphasis is indeed on interest analysis.
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essential characteristic of a functionally restrictive substantive rule is not that
it brings into play considerations of policy, but that it contains within itself a
limitation on its application to certain situations containing a foreign element.
As has been emphasized, the concept of functionally restrictive substantive
rules represents an exception to the ordinary choice-of-law process. Where a
state follows a rule-oriented approach to choice-of-law, the courts, in order to
determine the functionally restrictive character of a rule of substantive law,
have looked to the purpose behind a statute to ascertain whether the legislature
intended to impose built-in restrictions on its applicability. To that extent,
application of the concept of functionally restrictive substantive rules has
brought in considerations of policy "by the back door." But this occurs only
because considerations of policy are not an integral part of the choice-of-law
process in those states, and operate only as exceptions to the normal workings
of that process. In this sense the concept of functionally restrictive substantive
rules performs a function similar to that performed by other "policy"
exceptions, such as public policy, imperative laws, and the like.72 Neverthe-
less, the rationale for the application of the concept is not that it represents a
"policy" exception to choice-of-law rules, but that it demonstrates when a
substantive law rule is limited by its own force and is thus inapplicable to
certain situations containing a foreign element. Whenever such a limitation
exists within a substantive rule, for whatever reason, recognition of this
concept enables the court to avoid application of a law that it "does not want
to apply."
This being so, the utility of recognizing and applying the concept of
functionally restrictive substantive rules in states that follow a policy-
centered approach to choice-of-law should be readily apparent. Functionally
restrictive substantive rules necessarily exist in all legal systems, regardless
of the approach that is taken to choice-of-law. They exist whenever a statute
by its own terms is limited in applicability to certain situations containing a
foreign element. They also exist whenever the legislature has clearly
manifested its intention to the same effect, regardless of its reasons for so
doing. Since they necessarily exist, they should be given a name73 so that they
can be precisely identified and properly dealt with. The courts in this country
have in practice been applying the concept of functionally restrictive substan-
tive. rules to limit a statute's applicability, although they have not described
what they were doing with reference to this concept. A clear understanding of
this concept will enable the courts to utilize it more effectively, and, in
particular, to avoid the danger of construing a statute as containing a
72.. See Eek, Peremptory Norms and Private International Law, 2 RECUEIL DES COORS
1973, at 61-66 (1974).
73. See note 18 supra.
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self-limitation contrary to legislative purpose because of seemingly territo-
rially restrictive language contained within it.
More importantly, the concept of functionally restrictive substantive
rules has considerable utility in enabling a court, at the outset, to determine
whether a conflict of substantive laws in fact exists, and thus to avoid
unnecessary and possibly unsound choice-of-law decisions. Therefore, the
concept of functionally restrictive substantive rules, which has been
developed elsewhere for use in the rule-oriented context, can be adapted for
use in the American policy-centered context in relation to the important
threshold question "Is there a conflict of laws?"
A. AvOIDING CHOICE-OF-LAW DECISIONS
For the purposes of this Article, a functionally restrictive substantive rule is
defined as a statutory rule that, either by its own terms or as a matter of
demonstrable legislative intention as determined by the courts of the enacting
state, precludes itself from application to certain situations containing a
foreign element. Recognition of this concept will avoid unnecessary choice-
of-law decisions because almost invariably a conflict of laws question
involving two American states arises either out of a purported conflict
between a statute of one state designed to change the common law rule and the
remaining common law rule of the other state, 74 or in an area generally
covered by statute, such as liability for wrongful death, because of material
differences in the applicable statutes.75 Where the purported conflict is
between the statute of one state and the common law rule of the other, if the
statute is construed as constituting a functionally restrictive substantive rule,
the conflict is thereby removed since the result reached under the residually
applicable common law rule of the enacting state and the common law rule of
the other state presumably will be the same. This was the situation in Mount
Albert Borough.76 Likewise, where both states have differing statutes in an
area generally covered by statute, if one is construed as constituting a
functionally restrictive substantive rule, the conflict is eliminated, and the
case must be decided in accordance with the only statute that is capable of
application.
77
74. In the tort area, for example, by far the largest number of conflicts cases involve a
conflict of laws on the issue of the applicability of a guest statute.
75. In second place in the tort area has been a conflict of laws on the issue of limitations on
wrongful death recovery. Now that most states which have had such limits are revising them
upwards or abolishing them entirely, however, this fertile source of conflicts litigation may
diminish.
76. See text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
77. For example, the wrongful death act of one state is not applicable extraterritorially to a
fatal accident occurring in another state.
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Where both states have statutes in an area where there is a common
law-statute mix, that is, where the common law rule differs from state to state,
and some states have enacted statutes on the subject, it is possible that if one of
the statutes is inapplicable the result reached under that state's residually
applicable common law rule78 and under the common law rule or statute of the
other state will be the same. This is apparently what occurred in Kay's
Leasing.79 In other words, in the American context, the concept of function-
ally restrictive substantive rules can enable a court to determine at the outset
that a conflict of laws does not in fact exist because a purportedly applicable
statute giving rise to the conflict is by its own force inapplicable to the
situation containing a foreign element.
The utility of the concept of functionally restrictive sustantive rules in
the American context is in avoiding choice-of-law decisions, not in contribut-
ing to their resolution. In order to avoid an unnecessary and possibly improper
choice-of-law decision it is necessary to distinguish carefully between the
determination of the functionally restrictive nature of a statute and the
determination of a statute's underlying policy. The underlying policy of a
statute becomes relevant only after a conflict of laws is found to exist and a
choice-of-law decision must be made. This is why the above definition of a
functionally restrictive substantive rule looks to the express terms of the
statute or to the demonstrable legislative intention as determined by the
courts of the enacting state. The distinction between demonstrable legislative
intention and the underlying policy of the statute is crucial in distinguishing
the function that the concept of functionally restrictive substantive rules
should perform in the American context, where choice-of-law is to a large
extent policy-centered, from that which it performs in a system where
choice-of-law is essentially rule-oriented. In deciding whether a conflict of
laws exists, the forum court is not concerned with the underlying policy of the
statute; it is concerned only with the manifestation of legislative intention.
The determination of the legislature that the statute should not apply to certain
situations containing a foreign element may have been based on factors totally
apart from the statute's underlying purpose. The intention of the legislature
can be manifested by the express wording of the statute, or it can be
manifested by means going to what may be called the "legislative
dynamic. "80 The point to be emphasized is that unless the court finds such
manifest intent at this stage of the process, the statute is presumed to be
potentially applicable. Thus, there is considered to be a conflict of substantive
laws between the involved states.81 When the forum is making the choice-of-
78. See notes 45-46 and accompanying text supra.
79. See note 46 supra.
80. See notes 115-68 and accompanying text infra.
81. This is based on the assumption that because of the "renvoihang-up" the forum does
not, before finding that there is a conflict of laws necessitating a choice-of-law decision, look to
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law decision, since it has abandoned broad, state-selecting choice-of-law
rules, and is basing its decision, to one degree or another, on considerations of
policy and fairness, it will consider the underlying policy behind the statute of
the involved state or states, and may conclude that in light of that policy the
statute should not be applied to this situation containing a foreign element.
But wh6n it is looking to the functionally restrictive nature of a statute to
answer the question "Is there a conflict of laws?" it is concerned only with
the express wording of the statute or with demonstrable legislative intention
relating to the dynamic of legislative behavior. It is very important not to
confuse determining the functionally restrictive nature of a statute in order to
avoid unnecessary and improper choice-of-law decisions with basing the
choice-of-law decision, once a conflict has been found to exist, on considera-
tions of policy, including the underlying policy of the statute or statutes in
question. Therefore, the next focus of this Article must be to identify
functionally restrictive substantive rules as they appear in American statutory
law and conflicts cases.
B. IDENTIFYING FUNCTIONALLY REsTIcrIvE
SUBSTANTIVE RULES
1. "Expressly contained within the statute itself"
On the whole, here as elsewhere, it is fairly rare for a statute to contain express
language defining its applicability or nonapplicability to situations involving
a foreign element. 82 But there has been an increasing tendency, particularly in
proposed uniform laws, to take this factor into account. Sometimes this takes
the form of a directive setting forth general criteria of applicability, such as
section 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which provides that where
the parties have not made an effective choice of law, the Code shall be applied
to all transactions "bearing an approrpriate relation" to the enacting state. 83
A different approach, however, has been taken with respect to proposed
"no-fault" acts and the "no-fault" statutes that have been adopted by the
see if the court of the state whose law is sought to be used as a model, would, if the case had been
brought there, under its conflicts law, decide it in accordance with the substantive law of the
forum. See Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 5, at 95-102.
82. The same is true in what may be called the "non-conflicts situation." Such a situation
occurs when the question is simply whether the forum's statute applies to certain situations
containing a foreign element, and where there is generally no issue as to the direct application of
another state's law, e.g., a question of the applicability of American regulatory legislation to
activities occurring abroad or to persons connected with another state. SeeTrautman, The Role of
Conflicts Thinking in Defining the International Reach of American Regulatory Legislation, 22
OHIO ST. L.J. 586, 587 (1961).
83. Concerning the meaning of "appropriate relation," see Skinner v. Tober Foreign
Motors, Inc., 345 Mass. 429,* 187 N.E.2d 669 (1963). The Codealso contains some exceptions to
this provision, specifying what state's law shall determine particular questions. See CAVERS,
supra note 23, at 235-38.
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states. In what has been called a "notable departure from the usual legislative
indifference to conflict-of-laws problems, "84 these statutes almost invariably
contain provisions specifically defining their applicability to particular situa-
tions involving a foreign element. Since these provisions have the effect of
limiting the statute, and excluding its applicability from situations where, on
the basis of relevant choice-of-law considerations, the statute might be
expected to apply,85 they clearly illustrate the operation of functionally
restrictive substantive rules by language expressly contained in the statute
itself.
For example, the Uniform No-Fault Act provides that no-fault benefits
are available to the insured, his resident relatives, and occupants of his vehicle
when the vehicle is involved in an accident either within or without the
enacting state, but that such benefits are available to other categories of
victims only when the accident occurs within the borders of the enacting
state.86 Suppose that an accident involving a driver from State A, which has
enacted the Uniform Act, occurs in State B, injuring a pedestrian who resides
in State A. State B does not have a no-fault statute. The injured pedestrian
brings suit in State A seeking to recover no-fault benefits. There is no conflict
between the laws of State A and State B on this point. State B does not have a
no-fault statute, and the State A statute, by its own terms, is inapplicable to
this situation containing a foreign element. By expressly providing that only
the insured, his resident relatives, and the passengers in his vehicle can
recover no-fault benefits for an out-of-state accident, the legislature has also,
under the expressio unius principle, 87 expressly provided that recovery shall
not be available under the statute to a different category of persons who may
be injured by a State A insured vehicle in an accident occurring in another
state. Looking at the other side of the coin, that of exemption from tort
liability, the Uniform Act provides that the exemption from tort liability for
84. R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 183 (2d ed. 1975).
85. For a criticism of the territorially-oriented approach that produces this result and a
proposal for a "golden rule," see Kozyris, No-Fault Insurance and the Conflict of Laws-An
Interim Update, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1009; Kozyris, No-FaultAutomobileInsurance and the Conflict
of Laws-Cutting the Gordian Knot Home-Style, 1972 DUKE L.J. 331.
86. UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS ACT §§ 1, 2.
87. Kelly draws a distinction between directive and exclusive "localising" rules, the
former being treated as "directives to the courts of the forum to ensure that at least in a certain
class of cases the substantive provisions of the forum must be applied," and the latter being
treated as limiting the "application of the substantive provisions which they qualify to certain
cases, and to those cases alone." Localising Rules, supra note 21, at 253-54 (emphasis in
original). There can be no doubt, under a proper application of the expressio uniusprinciple, that
where the legislature has specifically provided that the statute apply to certain situations
containing a foreign element, it has necessarily decided to exclude the other cases falling into that
category, i.e., situations containing a foreign element. The functionally restrictive nature of the
rule would thus have to be classified as exclusive under Kelly's definition.
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the insured driver is limited to accidents occurring in the enacting state
88
Thus, if a driver whose automobile is both registered in State A and insured
under its no-fault plan is involved in an accident in State B, which does not
have a no-fault statute, he will be unable to assert the defense. Again, there is
simply no conflict of laws on this point. State B does not recognize an
exemption from tort liability, and under the applicable substantive law of
State A-its common law rule, since the exemption provision of the State A
no-fault statute is by its own terms inapplicable to an accident that occurs
outside of State A-there is no exemption either.
Another example of a statute that contains express provisions limiting its
applicability to certain situations involving a foreign element is the Uniform
Securities Act. 89 The sections regulating offers to sell and sales of securities
are applicable only when the offer to sell or to buy is "made and accepted in
this state." 90 The sections regulating purchases and offers to buy are
applicable when the "offer to buy is made or an offer to sell is made and
accepted in this state." 91 The concepts "offer in this state" and "acceptance
in this state" are specifically defined. 92 Thus, the statute is inapplicable, for
example, when the offer to sell is made in the enacting state but accepted in
another state. As both the examples of the Uniform No-Fault Act and the
Uniform Securities Act indicate, functionally restrictive substantive rules
contained in a statute itself are likely to be part of a legislative effort to define
the statute's applicability both affirmatively and negatively. Whether it is
desirable for the legislature to attempt this may be debatable, 93 but the point to
be emphasized is that to the extent the legislature has specifically set out the
statute's applicability to certain situations, it has, under the expressio unius
principle, precluded the statute's applicability to the situations not included.
The legislature has thus enacted a statute that by its terms constitutes a
functionally restrictive substantive rule.
As regards the express language of a statute, however, the real problem
in regard to functionally restrictive substantive rules is something very
different. Precisely because it has been fairly rare that a statute will contain
express language defining its applicability or nonapplicability-and perhaps
because the concept of functionally restrictive substantive rules has not been
88. UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS ALcr § 2.
89. The background of the decision to codify conflict of laws rules in the Uniform
Securities Act is discussed in Danton,- Territorially Limited Statutes and the Choice-of-Law
Process, 1 HARV. J. LEGIS. 115, 139-40 (1964).
90. UNIFORM SECURITIES AcT § 414(a).
91. Id. § 414(b).
92. Id. §§ 414(c), (d).
93. This appears particularly true since, as these examples indicate, the result will usually
take the form of mechanical rules. But see Danton, Territorially Limited Statutes and the
Choice-of-Law Process, I HARV. J. LEGIS. 115, 140-43 (1964).
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precisely defined-there is the danger that language contained in a statute
may be intepreted out of context or taken literally so as to be treated as a
self-limitation on the statute's applicability, although this was not intended by
the legislature and would be inconsistent with the statute's clear purpose.
Consider the following examples of this problem.
In Farber v. Smolack,94 a New York automobile owner had loaned his
automobile to his brother, who was taking a trip with his family to Florida. On
the return trip an accident occurred in North Carolina in which the brother's
wife was killed and his two children were injured. A wrongful death and
personal injury action was brought against the owner in New York. Under
New York law the owner would be vicariously liable for the negligence of the
user on the basis of consent to use, but under North Carolina law the owner
would not be vicariously liable if he derived no benefit from the driver's use of
the vehicle. 95 In terms of interest analysis, the case clearly presented a false
conflict: New York was interested in applying its law allowing recovery
against the insured New York defendant in favor of the New York victims and
their beneficiaries while North Carolina had no interest in enabling the New
York automobile owner to avoid liability. The defendant, 96 however, argued
that the New York vicarious liability statute was by its own terms inapplica-
ble-that it constituted, although this term was not used, a functionally
restrictive substantive rule-because it referred to the use and operation of a
vehicle "in this state.'' 97 The court gave this contention short shrift, noting
that the predecessor statute had used the term "upon a public highway," and
concluding that in making the change of wording to "in this state," the
legislature was not concerned with extraterritorial effect, but merely wanted
to make sure that the statute covered the situation of an accident that occurred
on private roadways or parking lots. 98 Since the statute, despite seemingly
restrictive language, was not interpreted as constituting a functionally restric-
tive substantive rule, when the purpose behind the particular wording in
relation to the overall purpose of the statute was considered, there was a
conflict of laws between the applicable substantive rule of North Carolina and
the applicable substantive rule of New York, and in this case of a false
conflict, the court applied New York law.
In Gaither v. Myers,99 however, the District of Columbia Circuit
94. 20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967).
95. Id. at 201-02, 229 N.E.2d at 37-38, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 250-51.
96. Or, more accurately, the defendant's insurer. See Sedler, The Territorial Imperative:
Automobile Accidents and the Significance of a State Line, 9 DUIQUESNE L. REv. 394, 399-400
(1971).
97. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388(1) (McKinney 1970).
98. 20 N.Y.2d at 204, 229 N.E.2d at 39, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
99. 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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interpreted the term "operated upon the public highways of the District of
Columbia" literally so as to preclude the application of a "presumption of
consent to use" provision contained in the District's financial responsibility
statute100 to an accident in Maryland involving an automobile owned by a
District resident. 101 Considering that the primary purpose of the statute was to
provide a financially responsible defendant for the benefit of a victim injured
by the negligent operation of an automobile, it would have been far more
reasonable to construe the provision as in Smolack, i.e., applicable to
accidents occurring "off the public highway" rather than being limited to
accidents occuring within the boundaries of the District. This is particularly
so in view of the very limited size of the District and the resultant likelihood
that vehicles registered in the District would in the ordinary course of use be
involved in accidents in Maryland and Virginia. As it turned out, interpreting
the statute as constituting a functionally restrictive substantive rule made no
real difference. Once the court found that the statute was by its own terms
inapplicable to this situation containing a foreign element, it looked to the
residual common law rule of the District, which, like the common law rule of
Maryland, contained a presumption that an automobile involved in an
accident was either operated by the owner or his agent. 1 2 In any event, the
court held that liability could be sustained on the alternative ground that the
owner had violated the District's "leaving the keys in the car" regulation. 1
03
The case does, however, point out the danger of looking to the literal language
of the statute and interpreting it in a functionally restrictive way without
regard to its underlying purpose.
The problem of looking to the literal language of the statute without
regard to its underlying purpose is also illustrated by the provision of the New
York Insurance Law 1°4 that was involved in Zogg v. Penn Mutual Life
Insurance Co.10 5 That provision invalidated any clause in a life insurance
policy that excluded liability for death as a result of suicide within 2 years
from the date of issue of the policy, and referred to a "policy of life insurance
delivered or issued for delivery in this state. " 10 6 In Zogg the insured was a
New York resident. Although the policy was mailed to him in New York, he
had applied for it and paid the first premium to the company's office in
100. 40 D.C. CODE § 424 (1973).
101. The court cited a statement by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to that effect
in a case where there was no real question as to the applicability of District of Columbia
substantive law. 404 F.2d at2l9n.6, citingKnightv. Handley Motor Co., 198A.2d747, 750 (D.C.
App. 1964).
102. Id. at 219-20.
103. Id. at 220-24.
104. N.Y. INs. LAW § 155 (McKinney 1966).
105. 276 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1960).
106. N.Y. INs. LAW § 155.2 (McKinney 1966).
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Massachusetts. The company argued that Massachusetts law, which would
uphold the clause, applied as the law of the "place of making." The Second
Circuit, sitting as a New York court and applying a "center of gravity"
approach,107 rejected that contention and held that New York law applied.
The insurer had also contended that the New York statute was by its own
terms inapplicable when the underlying insurance contract had been entered
into in another state. To the contrary, said the court, it was irrelevant where
the contract was made since, as it noted, "the primary purpose of the
enactment was to protect residents of the state. . . and the tests of delivery or
issuance for delivery in the state were adopted as a practical means of
achieving such protection." 
108
Cavers, who somewhat resists the concept of functionally restrictive
substantive rules insofar as it would limit the forum's power to choose the
applicable law,'19 discusses the New York statute involved in Zogg and posits
the examples of (1) an insurance policy mailed to a Massachusetts resident
who was temporarily in New York after the binder had been executed in
Massachusetts and (2) a policy mailed to a New York resident temporarily in
Massachusetts. He asks whether in those cases the statute should be inter-
preted as containing a localizing rule, so as to preclude its application in the
second example, and conversely, as containing a directive as to its applica-
tion which would require that it be applied in the first example. 011 He
contends that it should not be so interpreted, but rather that the court should
hold that the legislature did not intend to preclude the use of choice-of-law
principles to deal with cases that failed to satisfy the statute's express
conditions for its applicability.' 1 '
It seems that Cavers misses the point, for he attaches too much
significance to the localizing or territorially restrictive language contained in
the statute without relating that language to the statute's clearly demonstrated
purpose. It seems clear, considering the fact that the statute dealt with life
insurance contracts, which have always been heavily regulated by the
states,1 12 that the legislature was trying to define specifically the situations in
wliich the statute would and would not be applicable. As the court pointed out
107. The New York court first adopted this approach for contract cases in Auten v. Auten,
308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). As regards life insurance contracts, the state of the most
significant relationship is considered to be the state of the insured's domicile. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 192 (1971).
108. 276 F.2d at 865.
109. See American Perspective, supra note 23, at 133-35.
110. Whenever the forum's.statute contains a specific directive that it be applied, the forum
court must do so, assuming, of course, that the application is constitutional.
111. CAVERS, supra note 23, at 230-31 ("The internal rule is not spatially-conditioned, but its
application is subject to a statutory directive.").
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Explanatory Notes § 192 (1971).
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in Zogg, the primary purpose of the statute was to protect New York residents
who entered into life insurance contracts and their beneficiaries from what the
state considered to be overreaching on the part of life insurance companies,
and its strong interest in doing so cannot be doubted. 113 By the same token,
New York has no real interest in protecting residents of other states from such
overreaching regardless of the factual contacts that the transaction may have
had with New York. The language used in the statute must be interpreted in
light of the clearly demonstrated legislative purpose. It is obvious, as the court
noted in Zogg, that when the legislature used the term "delivered or issued for
delivery in this state," it was trying to protect New York residents. 114 When
the statutory language is interpreted functionally in light of the clearly
demonstrated legislative purpose, rather than literally or spatially, the only
reasonable interpretation is that it is referring to an insurance policy issued on
the life of a New York resident and only to such policies-regardless of
where the policy was physically delivered or where the contract was
executed. So interpreted, the statute, like the Uniform No-Fault Act and the
Uniform Securities Act, contains both a directive as to when it shall be
applied-when the policy is issued on the life of a New York resident-and a
functionally restrictive limitation precluding its application when the policy
is not issued on the life of a New York resident.
In summary, it is clear in more recently enacted statutes, such as the
no-fault acts, that the legislature has prescribed the statute's applicability to
situations containing a foreign element, both affirmatively and negatively. To
the extent that its application is specifically prescribed, the statute may be said
to constitute a functionally restrictive substantive rule. In the case of other
statutes, however, the courts should not be misled by seemingly restrictive
language, usually of the territorial variety, into giving the statute a function-
ally restrictive interpretation when this would be inconsistent with the
statute's clearly demonstrated purpose. On the other hand, when the language
contained in a statute is interpreted in light of the clearly demonstrated
legislative purpose, it may be clear that the legislature was trying to define the
scope of the statute's application, as in the case of the provision of the New
York insurance law involved in Zogg. Recognition of the concept of function-
ally restrictive substantive rules will serve to assist the courts in determining
when the legislature was specifically trying to restrict the scope of the
statute's application and when it was not.
113. Id.
114. 276 F.2d at 865.
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2. "As a matter of demonstrable legislative intention"
The second situation in which a statute may be found to constitute a
functionally restrictive substantive rule is where, as a matter of demonstrable
legislative intention as determined by the courts of the enacting state, the
statute is construed as being inapplicable to certain situations, containing a
foreign element. As pointed out previously, the use of the term "demonstra-
ble legislative intention" and the qualification of "as determined by the
courts of the enacting state" are very important to the definition of function-
ally restrictive substantive rules. Both features are integral to an understand-
ing of the utility of the functionally restrictive limitation concept in the
American context. Demonstrable legislative intention refers to a determina-
tion on the basis of legislative history and behavior-what is here termed the
legislative dynamic-which only the courts of the enacting state, which are
engaged in an ongoing relationship with their own legislature and are thus in
the best position to understand its intention and behavior, can realistically
determine.
Again, it must be emphasized that the reference to demonstrable
legislative intention is a reference to something very different from the
underlying policy of a statute. In the American context, where choice-of-law
is generally policy-centered, consideration of the underlying policy of a
statute is an integral part of the choice-of-law process. But this process does
not properly come into play until a conflict of laws is found to exist. When a
court is dealing with the threshold question "Is there a conflict of laws?" it is
not concerned with the underlying policy of the statute. The court is
concerned only with the legislative history of the particular statute and of the
behavior of the legislature with respect to the enactment or reenactment of that
particular statute insofar as such legislative history and behavior indicates
whether the legislature intended to preclude the application of the statute to
the situation containing a foreign element. The legislature may have made the
determination, for reasons which it considered valid, that the statute should
not be applicable to this situation, even though such application would
advance the statute's underlying policy. Once it is clear that the legislature has
made that determination, the courts of the enacting state are bound as a
matter of court-legislature relations to respect it, and so should the courts of
another state whenever the legislature's intention has been authoritatively
declared by the courts of the enacting state. The matter of demonstrable
legislative intention is illustrated most clearly in the matter of extraterritorial
application of statutes.
Although, in this country as elsewhere, most legislation has been
enacted without reference to its applicability to situations containing a foreign
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element, historically, because of American acceptance of the territorial
principle, 115 there was a presumption that legislation was not applicable
extraterritorially. 116 This presumption operated as a sort of built-in functional
restriction. Unless the contrary intention appeared, a statute was not applic-
able when all of the legally significant facts calling the statutory provisions
into play did not occur within the enacting state. For example, wrongful death
acts were early interpreted as being inapplicable when the fatal accident
occurred outside of the enacting state, even though both the victim and the
defendant resided in the enacting state. 117 In practice, however, the principle
that legislation was presumed inapplicable extraterritorially was swallowed
up by the territorially oriented choice-of-law rules of the traditional
approach 18 which produced the same result. For example, in the classic tort
case of Alabama & Great Southern R.R. v. Carroll,119 the allegedly
negligent act occurred in Alabama while the accident resulting from that act
occurred in Mississippi. The plaintiff was an Alabama resident and the
railroad was incorporated in Alabama. Under the common law rule, as it
existed in both Alabama and Mississippi at that time, the plaintiff could not
recover in a tort action because of the "fellow servant" doctrine. Under the
newly enacted Alabama Employer's Liability Act, however, strict liability
was imposed on the employer for employee injuries. Since the plaintiff
asserted that an Alabama statute was applicable in a proceeding brought in an
Alabama court, the proper question for the Alabama court was whether the
legislature intended the statute to be applicable extraterritorially to this
situation containing a foreign element. But the court did not approach the
question in terms of legislative intention. Instead it applied the traditional
choice-of-law rule that liability for tort was determined by the law of the
"place of the wrong," which it characterized as Mississippi, since the last
act-the suffering of the injury-occurred there. 120 Even if the court had
approached the question in terms of legislative intention, it probably would
have reached the same result. Given the presumption existing at that time
against extraterritorial application of statutes, buttressed in this case by the
fact that the Alabama statute was designed to abrogate the existing common
law rule, it could have properly concluded that the legislature intended that
the statute apply only to accidents occurring in Alabama. If it had interpreted
115. See Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 5, at 35-38.
116. "All legislation is prima facie territorial." American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
117. See, e.g., Murray's Adm'x v. Louisville & N.R.R., 132 Ky. 336, 110 S.W. 334 (1908);
Whitford v. Panama R.R., 23 N.Y. 465 (1861).
118. Concerning the relationship between the territoriality principle as developed by Story
and the theory of vested rights that was the basis of the traditional approach, seeSedler, Babcock
v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 5, at 38-39.
119. 97 Ala. 126, 11-So. 803 (1892).
120. RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLCr OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
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the statute in this manner-if it had interpreted it, in other words, as
constituting a functionally restrictive substantive rule, inapplicable to acci-
dents occurring outside of Alabama-there would not have been a conflict of
laws between Alabama and Mississippi. Thus, a choice-of-law decision
would have been unnecessary, since under the common law rule of Alabama,
applicable residually in cases not covered by the statute, 121 as well as under
the common law rule of Mississippi, the plaintiff would be barred from
recovery by the "fellow servant" doctrine. Be that as it may, the same result
was reached under the "place of the wrong" rule, and application of that rule
operated to restrict the application of a state's tort liability statutes to the
situation where the accident occurred within the borders of the enacting
state.
122
The coincidence in result produced by the tort choice-of-law rule that the
law of the state where the injury occurred governed and by the principle that
legislation was presumed not to apply extraterritorially also obscured recogni-
tion of the functionally restrictive nature of wrongful death acts. In terms of
the availability of a cause of action for wrongful death, this did not really
matter, since all states have wrongful death acts,123 and the beneficiaries
could sue under the wrongful death act of the state where the fatal accident
occurred. Problems arose, however, in regard to whether the forum, which
was usually the decedent's and beneficiaries' home state, would refuse to
entertain an action under a foreign wrongful death act on "public policy"
grounds,124 or whether it could entertain such an action because of legislative
restrictions on hearing cases brought under foreign acts.125 Even more
significant was the fact that many states had limitations on the amount
recoverable in a wrongful death action. If the accident occurred in such a
state, the plaintiff was limited to the amount recoverable under the state's
statute. 126 Until Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,127 that is, when the New
York Court of Appeals, by the manipulative techniques of procedural
121. See notes 45-46 and accompanying text supra.
122. Similarly, in the classic contracts case of Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878), the
court could have held that in the absence of an affirmative indication of extraterritorial
application, the Massachusetts legislature did not intend that its statute should apply when all of
the dealings did not occur in Massachusetts. As these examples indicate, the presumption against
extraterritorial application of statutes, like the rules of the traditional approach, would frequently
result in the failure to apply the forum's statute, although, in light of the statute's underlying
policy, it should be applied to the particular aituation containing a foreign element.
123. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 902 (4th ed. 1971).
124. See, e.g., the classic public policy case of Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99,120
N.E. 198 (1918).
125. See First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter,
341 U.S. 609 (1951).
126. See, e.g., Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
127. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
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characterization and public policy, succeeded in holding that while suit had to
be brought under the Massachusetts wrongful death act, the measure of
recovery would in effect be determined by New York law. 12 8 It should be
noted that in Kilberg, not only did Massachusetts law apply as the law of the
"place of the wrong" under New York's then-existing choice-of-law rule,
but that even apart from choice-of-law considerations, New York's own
wrongful death act had been previously construed as being inapplicable to
fatal accidents occurring outside New York. 1
29
Kilberg, followed 2 years later by Babcock v. Jackson,130 heralded the
demise of the traditional approach to choice-of-law in this country. But the
abandonment of the traditional approach as such did not affect the matter of
extraterritorial application of statutes. In Kilberg, for example, even if the
New York court had repudiated the traditional approach to choice-of-law, it
would have still been left with its earlier holding that, as a matter of legislative
intention, the New York wrongful death act was not applicable to fatal
accidents occurring in another state. This problem, it should be noted, was not
present in Babcock. There the New York law that the court applied was its
common law rule allowing recovery against a negligent defendant by an
injured plaintiff even if the plaintiff was a guest passenger in the defendant's
automobile. '31 But after abandoning the territorially oriented choice-of-law
rules of the traditional approach, the court did not want to revert to territorial-
ity when dealing with a death case. Thus, in Farber v. Smolack 32 it removed
the territorially-in effect functionally-restrictive character of the New
York wrongful death act, holding that it could be applied to fatal accidents
occuring outside of New York.
133
By the same token, today most courts committed to a policy-centered or
any other modem approach to choice-of-law' 34 do not distinguish between
statutes and common law rules, and the historical presumption against
128. The decision can be explained theoretically by saying that New York fashioned a rule
of decision for the case, using Massachusetts law as a model in part, Le., insofar as it created a
cause of action for wrongful death, and New York law as the law of the forum for the remainder,
i.e., insofar as it allowed full recovery. SeeSedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 5,
at 130-32. That this was what New York was doing was confirmed in Pearson v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 560-61 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963), holding that.
New York was not precluded by the full faith and credit clause from so proceeding.
129. Whitford v. Panama R.R., 23 N.Y. 465 (1861).
130. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
131. Id. at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
132. 20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967).
133. Note that in Far'er there was no conflict of laws with respect to wrongful death
liability, since the North Carolina statute did not contain any limit on the amount recoverable.
134. Included in this definition is the "modern rules" approach of the Restatement. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcr OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
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extraterritorial application of statutes has been virtually abandoned for
choice-of-law purposes. 135 Absent an affirmative indication, relating to the
legislative dynamic, that the forum's statute is not to be applied extraterrito-
rially to the situation containing a foreign element, when the forum is making
a choice-of-law decision, it does not treat statutes differently from common
law rules. The forum will assume that its statute, or the statute of the other
involved state, is potentially applicable to this situation containing a foreign
element in the same manner as it makes this assumption with respect to
common law rules.13 6 And whether a particular statute or common law rule
will be applied is determined with reference both to considerations of the
policy underlying the statute or the common law rule and to fairness to the
parties. 137 The traditional presumption against extraterritorial application of
statutes, therefore, has been effectively removed from the choice-of-law
process, along with the traditional, territorially-oriented approach to choice-
of-law itself.
What is significant, however, is that in certain cases, totally apart from
choice-of-law considerations, and indeed even in contradiction to them, the
forum court has concluded that there is an affirmative indication relating to
the legislative dynamic that the forum's statute is not to be applied extrater-
ritorially. In such a case, the statute, as a matter of demonstrable legislative
intention, constitutes a functionally restrictive substantive rule. Once this is
recognized there generally will be no conflict between the applicable
substantive law of the forum and that of the other involved state. The best
example of this is the holding of the Illinois Supreme Court with respect to the
135. Similarly, the presumption against extraterritorial application of regulatory legislation
is not very strong, and often considerations relevant to determining the application of the forum's
law to conflicts situations are also relevant to determining the application of regulatory legislation
to situations containing a foreign element. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bailey v. Krise, 18 Ohio St. 2d
191, 249 N.E.2d 55, 47 Ohio Op. 2d 432 (1969). See generally Trautman, The Role of Conflicts
Thinking in Defining the International Reach of American Regulatory Legislation, 22 OHIo ST.
L.J. 586 (1961).
136. See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 III. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593- (1970) (wrongful death);
Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel Co., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957) (dram shop act); Griffith v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) (wrongful death).
137. See, e.g., Turcotte v. Ford MotorCo.,494 F.2d 173 (lstCir. 1974), wherethe courtheld
that the Rhode Island wrongful death act, allowing unlimited recovery, and its common law rule,
imposing strict liability for harm resulting from a defective product, applied to a claim arising out
of a fatal accident involving a Rhode Island decedent that occurred in Massachusetts. In an
earlier case, a federal district court had held that the Rhode Island wrongful death act did not
apply extraterritorially to allow suit under that act by the beneficiaries of a Rhode Island resident
killed while working in Massachusetts, and that Rhode Island would not allow suit under the
Massachusetts wrongful death act on "public policy" grounds. Thayer v. Perini Corp., 303 F.
Supp. 683 (D.R.I. 1969). Holding to the contrary and allowing suit under the Rhode Island
wrongful death act for the death of a Rhode Island resident that occurred in Massachusetts was
Tiernan V. Westext Transp., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1256 (D.R.I. 1969).
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Illinois Dram Shop Act 3' in Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post.139 In that
case the plaintiff, a resident of Illinois, was injured in Wisconsin when he was
struck by an intoxicated driver, also a resident of Illinois. The driver's
intoxication resulted at least in part from liquor furnished to him by the
defendant in Illinois. Suit was brought in Illinois. The plaintiff contended that
the defendant was liable under the Illinois Dram Shop Act. Earlier Illinois
appellate court decisions had held in identical situations that the Illinois Dram
Shop Act was inapplicable, both on the ground that liability in tort was
governed by the law of the "place of the wrong,"140 and on the ground that
the Illinois Dram Shop Act was not susceptible of extraterritorial applica-
tion. 4 In the meantime, however, the Illinois Supreme Court had abandoned
the traditional approach to choice-of-law in favor of a "center of gravity"
approach. 42 In Graham, the appellate court, using the latter approach, held
that Illinois was the "center of gravity," so that the Dram Shop Act was
applicable. 1
43
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Pointing out that "[t]he problem
here is not one of conflict of choice of laws in the usual sense," 144 it noted that
since Wisconsin did not have a dram shop act, the plaintiff could only recover
under the Illinois act, and that, "[t]he answer depends on whether the Illinois
act may be given extraterritorial effect." 45 The court held that it could not,
because the legislature, by its behavior in regard to the statute, clearly
demonstrated its intention that the statute should not apply to a situation
containing a foreign element. 146 The court noted that after it had held that the
Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act did not have extraterritorial effect, the
legislature expressly amended the statute to provide that it applied to injuries
occurring outside the state when the contract of employment was made in
Illinois. 47 On the other hand, after the court had held that the Occupational
Diseases Act was not applicable extraterritorially, there was no similar
amendment of that statute. 148 Likewise, the legislature had never amended the
Dram Shop Act to give it extraterritorial effect, although it had amended it a
number of times since the Illinois appellate courts had first held that it was not
applicable extraterritorially, and in fact had reenacted the entire act without
138. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1976).
139. 43 Ill. 2d 1, 248 N.E.2d 657 (1969).
140. Eldridge v. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 151, 95 N.E.2d 512 (1950).
141. Butler v. Wittland, 18 Ill. App. 2d 578, 153 N.E.2d 106 (1958).
142. Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966).
143. 97 Ill. App. 2d 139, 239 N.E.2d 856 (1968).
144. 43 Ill. 2d at 5, 248 N.E.2d at 659.
145. Id. at 6, 248 N.E.2d at 659.
146. Id. at 6-7, 248 N.E.2d at 660-61.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 6, 248 N.E.2d at 660.
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including a provision for its extraterritorial effect. 149 Observing that the
Illinois Dram Shop Act was "particularly severe," 150 the court went on to say
that
the legislature's failure to enact a provision giving the Dram Shop
Act extraterritorial effect may have been prompted by a variety of
reasonable policy considerations. Whatever those considerations
may have been, the question was uniquely one for the legislature,
not the courts, to ponder and decide.
51
In other words, the court looked to the behavior of the legislature with respect
to statutes that previously had been judicially held to be without extraterrito-
rial effect and concluded that when the legislature wanted the statute to be
applicable extraterritorially, it would expressly amend it to say so. Since it
had not done this to the Dram Shop Act, the court felt compelled to hold that
the legislature did not want th6 statute to have extraterritorial effect-that it
constituted a functionally restrictive substantive rule limited to accidents
occurring in Illinois. 152 Once the court made that determination, it also found
that there was no conflict of laws, since under the residually applicable
common law rule of Illinois and the common law rule of Wisconsin, the
plaintiff was not entitled to recover.
While one may agree.or disagree with the Illinois court's interpretation
of legislative intention, what is significant is that the case most clearly
demonstrates how the court of the enacting state, interpreting the legislative
dynamic and the behavior of its legislature, can conclude that a statute
constitutes a functionally restrictive substantive rule. The result'is usually that
there is no conflict of laws between the involved states, since-most often the
forum's residually applicable common law rule, and the common law rule of
the other involved state, do not differ.
A similar result was reached by the Texas Supreme Court with respect to
the Texas wrongful death act in Marmon v. Mustang Aviation Inc.153 The
fatal accident occurred in Colorado, but most of the victims were Texas
residents. The defendant was a Texas corporation, and the trip had originated
in Texas and was to end there. Under the Colorado wrongful death act there
was a limitation on the amount recoverable; the Texas act contained no such
149. Id.
150. Id. at 7, 248 N.E.2d at 660.
151. Id., 248 N.E.2d at 660-61.
152. Since the criteria concerning applicability were expressed in territorial terms, the
statute would not by its own force be inapplicable to other situations containing a foreign
element, such as, for instance, a nonresident plaintiff injured in Illinois as aresult of intoxication
produced there. In such a case, apart from any interest in allowitig the nonresident plaintiff to
recover in order to implement the act's compensatory policy, there would be a clear interest in
allowing recovery in order to implement its admonitory policy.
153. 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968).
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limitation. The court held that the Texas wrongful death act did not apply to a
fatal accident occurring in another state, thus requiring the plaintiffs to bring
suit under the Colorado act with its limitation on the amount recoverable. 154
The court implicitly assumed the possibility of an extraterritorial application
of the act in the absence of legislative preclusion of such an application.
Nevertheless, the court, relying upon earlier interpretations of the statute and
the failure of the legislature in reenactments of the statute subsequent to those
interpretations to revise it, held that the legislature had not intended the statute
to operate extraterritorially.155 As Professor Ehrenzweig points out in com-
menting on the case, once the court interpreted legislative intent in this
manner, it had no alternative but to limit the statute's application, despite the
forum's interest in applying its law here. 156 And, as in Graham, the court
emphasized that it was not deciding a choice-of-law question, noting that
courts which had applied the forum's wrongful death act in similar circum-
stances "were not faced with prior holdings limiting the statute's extraterrito-
rial applicability.'1 57 Since the Texas wrongful death act was, as a matter of
demonstrable legislative intention, inapplicable to this situation containing a
foreign element, it constituted a functionally restrictive substantive rule as
that concept has been defined in this Article. The court did not have a choice
between allowing unlimited recovery under the Texas act or limited recovery
under the Colorado act.
Sometimes the question whether a statute constitutes a functionally
restrictive substantive rule arises in an either-or posture. The statute in
question may represent a strong regulatory policy of the forum, so that unless
as a matter of demonstrable legislative intention it is inapplicable to this
situation containing a foreign element, the court must apply it. In such a case,
no choice-of-law question is presented. If the statute, however, is construed
as constituting a functionally restrictive substantive rule, there will generally
be no conflict between the law of the forum applicable in the absence of the
statute and the law of the other involved state. For example, in Lee v. Great
Northern Nekoosa Corp.15 a lease contract involving Alabama land was
executed in Georgia. At the time of execution the lessee was a foreign
154. Unlike te Nqew Yurk o-urt in kilberg, the Texas court was unwilling to disregard the
Colorado limitation by the use of "manipulative techniques" or otherwise. Id. at 194.
155. Another legislative provision authorized suit for wrongful death occurring in another
state under the wrongful death act of that state. The court was unwilling to construe this as
demonstrating an intention to remove the territorially restrictive nature of the Texas wrongful
death act. Id. at 185.
156. Ehrenzweig, Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law, 2 RECUEIL DES CouRs
1968, at 167, 185 (1969).
157. 430 S.W.2d at 194. In Farber v. Smolack, 20 N.Y.2d 198,229 N.E.2d 36,282 N.Y.S.2d
248 (1967), the New York court was faced with such prior holdings, but ignored them.
158. 465 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1972).
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corporation which had not qualified to do business in Alabama. Subse-
quently, the lessee's interest passed to another foreign corporation which had
qualified. The plaintiff lessor brought suit to cancel the lease on the ground
that it was void from its inception, relying on a statute which provided:
No corporation, its agents, officers or servants shall transact any
business for or in the name of such corporation within the state of
Alabama without having first procured said permit and all con-
tracts, engagements or undertakings or agreements with, by or to
such corporations made without obtaining such permit shall be null
and void. 59
If this statute were found to have been applicable to the lease in question the
contract would have been void from its inception. The Fifth Circuit found,
however, that the Alabama courts had construed this statute in pari materia
with two similar statutes that expressly referred to "contracts made in this
state." 160 This being so, the statute was, as a matter of demonstrable
legislative intention, inapplicable to this contract made by a nonqualifying
foreign corporation and the Georgia plaintiff. 161 Again, the question was not
one of choice-of-law. If the Alabama statute was applicable to this situation
containing a foreign element, the court had to apply it and void the contract. If
it was not applicable-if it was construed as constituting a functionally
restrictive substantive rule-the contract was valid under the general law of
contracts of both Alabama and Georgia.
Similarly, in Ore-Ida Potato Products, Inc. v. United Pacific Insurance
Co., 162 it was argued that the Idaho statute governing the issuance of produce
dealers' bonds applied to all transactions of a produce dealer licensed and
bonded in Idaho, although the sale and delivery of the produce occurred
entirely in Oregon. Under any approach to choice-of-law, it would seem that
Oregon law should apply to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties to
the Oregon transactions. The court took the position that precisely because a
strong regulatory policy was involved the statute would not be applied to
transactions occurring entirely in another state unless the contrary intention
affirmatively appeared.163 Thus, the statute was construed as constituting a
functionally restrictive substantive rule, inapplicable to bonds covering the
sale and delivery of produce in another state.
In certain cases, although a statute is not by its terms functionally
restricted, it may be given a functionally restrictive interpretation by the
courts of the enacting state when they have concluded that based on demonstra-
159. ALA. CODE, tit. 51, § 345 (1973).
160. 465 F.2d at 1135.
161. Id.
162. 392 P.2d 191 (Idaho 1964).
163. Id. at 195-96.
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ble legislative intention-for reasons relating to what is here termed the
legislative dynamic-the statute should not be applicable to this particular
situation containing a foreign element. This determination is made totally
apart from considerations of the policy underlying the statute. Policy consid-
erations do not become relevant until the court is satisfied that the statute does
not constitute a functionally restrictive substantive rule, where a conflict of
laws exists requiring a choice-of-law decision. As a practical matter, the
question whether a statute, as a matter of demonstrable legislative
intention, will be interpreted as constituting a functionally restrictive substan-
tive rule ties in with the traditional presumption against the extraterritorial
application of statutes. If the court of the enacting state concludes that its
legislature still follows that presumption, either generally or, more likely,
with reference to a particular statute, the court must adhere to the legislative
directive and give the statute a functionally restrictive interpretation.
In summary, when a statute of the forum is in issue in a case, there are
three possibilities with regard to the legislature's indication of its applicabil-
ity. The legislature may have directed either expressly or as a matter of
demonstrable legislative intention that the statute shall be applied to a
situation containing a foreign element. 164 Assuming that such application is
constitutional, 165 the forum court must apply it totally apart from choice-of-
law considerations. Conversely, where the statute, by its own terms or as a
matter of demonstrable legislative intention, is inapplicable to a situation
containing a foreign element, that is, when it constitutes a functionally
restrictive substantive rule, the forum cannot apply it. In such a case, there is
usually no conflict of laws since the preexisting common law rule of the
forum, which takes over when the statute is inapplicable, will usually produce
the same result as the law of the other state. 166 Or if the case involves an area
regulated by statute, such as recovery for wrongful death, the plaintiff must
proceed under the statute of the other state, which, as a practical matter, is
likely to be applicable when the forum's statute is not. 167 The more common
situation is where the applicability of a statute to a situation containing a
foreign element is neither expressly defined nor clear as a matter of demonstra-
ble legislative intention. There is then a conflict between the law of the
164. The no fault statutes provide a good example of this possibility.'See text accompanying
notes 84-88 supra.
165. There will usually be no serious question concerning this under the Supreme Court's
present "interest and fairness" approach to constitutional limitations on choice-of-law. Clay v.
Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
166. If, however, the other state has an applicable statute which would produce a result
different from that which would be produced under the common law rule of the forum, a conflict
could exist.
167. The wrongful death acts of the state of injury do not, and probably constitutionally
could not, expressly exclude nonresidents from their coverage. See B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS
oNTmE CoNFLicr OF LAWS 538 (1963).
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forum and the law of the other involved state (assuming that a conflict of laws
issue will be raised only when the applicable law of the other state would
produce a different result than would the forum's statute168) which the forum
must resolve by a consideration of (1) the policies behind its statute and
behind the law of the other state and (2) fairness to the parties. But recognition
of the concept of functionally restrictive substantive rules will avoid the
necessity of a choice-of-law decision in those situations where the forum's
statute is by its own terms or as a matter of demonstrable legislative intention
inapplicable so that no conflict of laws in fact exists. This, it is submitted, is a
very useful function that the concept of functionally restrictive substantive
rules can be adapted to perform in the American context.
IV. "FOREIGN" FUNCTIONALLY RESTRICTIVE
SUBSTANTIVE RULES
This Article has thus far approached the matter of functionally restrictive
substantive rules only from the perspective of the forum determining the
functionally' restrictive nature of statutes enacted by its own legislature.
Consider now the matter of the forum construing the functionally restrictive
nature of the statute of another state. The courts of the enacting state are
bound, of course, as a matter of their internal law of court-legislature
relations, to recognize the functionally restrictive nature of the statutes
enacted by their own legislature, just as they are bound to apply those statutes
when directed to do so either expressly or as a matter of demonstrable
legislative intention, regardless of choice-of-law considerations. The courts,
however, are equally free to disregard the functionally restrictive nature of
another state's statute, 169 just as they are free to refuse to recognize a directive
of another state that its law be applied. 170 And since courts have long been
accustomed to ignoring another state's limitation on the applicability of its
own law by its choice-of-law rules-what is here called the "renvoi hang-
up'- 171 -it may be asked whether they will be willing to accept the function-
ally restrictive nature of a statute of another state.
It has been argued that they should not do so, or at least that they should
not consider themselves bound by another state's determination that its law is
functionally restricted. Cavers asks why, if the forum concludes that the case
before it should be resolved with reference to the law of another state, ".
should the forum be restrained from exercising its authority by the fact that the
contrary view of [the other state] is embodied in a statutory limitation rather
168. See note 81 supra.
169. Cf. Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965).
170. Cf. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
171. See note 81 supra.
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than in a choice-of-law rule?" 172 Another commentator insists that since both
general conflicts rules and localizing rules perform the function of determin-
ing whether certain rules of domestic law apply in a particular case, they
should be treated the same; to the extent that the forum does not pay attention
to the other state's choice-of-law rules, it should not pay attention to the
localizing or functionally restrictive interpretation that the other state puts on
its own law either. 1
73
De Nova, on the other hand, sees a crucial distinction between rejection
of the renvoi in the context of a rule-oriented approach to choice-of-law and
the failure to recognize the functionally restrictive character of another state's
substantive rule. According to De Nova,
Applying a foreign "self-limiting" substantive rule on its own
terms-namely, only when the case at hand perfectly fits its
schema-is not paying obeisance to foreign rules of private interna-
tional law, which is the essence of renvoi. It is simply applying that
substantive rule of the competent legal order which does fit the
facts of a given case-as those facts are seen by that legal order. 174
De Nova's analysis is clearly correct insofar as the concept of functionally
restrictive substantive rules operates within the framework of a rule-oriented
approach to choice of law. The forum applies its choice-of-law rule without
regard to the choice-of-law rule of the chosen state, and once the choice is
made, it applies "within the 'competent' foreign law the correct rules of
decision."
175
In the American context, however, the problem is not one of applying
"within the 'competent' foreign law the correct rules of decision," but of
deciding whether, based on considerations of policy and fairness to the
parties, the law of the forum should be displaced and the law of another state
used as a model for the rule of decision in the particular case. Here, the
question for the forum court would be whether it should find the existence of a
conflict of laws and make a choice-of-law decision where the law of the other
state that is sought to be used as a model is by its own force inapplicable to this
situation containing a foreign element. Consider as an example the following
fact situation based on Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post.176 An Illinois
tavernkeeper serves liquor to an intoxicated patron in Illinois, and an accident
172. American Perspective, supra note 20, at 134.
173. See Prebble, supra note 26, at 717. Concerning the gap problem that can result within a
framework of a rules-oriented approach to choice-of-law when the forum looks to the function-
ally restrictive character of the law of the lex causae, see notes 47-53 and accompanying text
supra.
174. De Nova, Conflict of Laws, supra note 19, at 1570 (emphasis in original).
175. Id. at 1571.
176. 43 Ill. 2d 1, 248 N.E.2d 657 (1969).
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resulting from such intoxication occurs in Wisconsin, injuring an Illinois
plaintiff. The tavern is part of a chain that also does business in Wisconsin,
and the plaintiff brings suit there. In terms of interest analysis, this is the case
of a false conflictlV brought in the state that has no interest in applying its own
substantive law on the point in issue.178 Illinois has a real interest in applying
its dram shop act in favor of an Illinois victim injured as a result of an Illi-
nois tavernkeeper's liquor sale, notwithstanding that the accident occurred in
Wisconsin. The application of Illinois law will advance both the admonitory
and compensatory policies reflected in that law, and, conversely, no policy of
Wisconsin will be impaired by allowing the Illinois victim to recover against
the Illinois tavernkeeper. 179 Clearly this is the situation where, to quote
Cavers, Wisconsin should see the application of Illinois substantive law as
"achieving fairness to the parties as well as a sensible allocation of rule-
making responsibility among the states," 18 0 and an instance where Cavers
would ask, "[w]hy should the forum be restrained from exercising its.
authority by the fact that the contrary view of [illinois] is embodied in a
statutory limitation rather than in a choice-of-law rule?" ' l
The short answer to this question182 is that the Illinois Legislature, for
reasons sufficient to it,183 has determined that its statute allowing recovery
should not apply to this situation containing a foreign element. Wisconsin law
does not allow recovery 184 and it would be the height of "officious inter-
meddling"1 5 for Wisconsin, which has no interest in applying its law
here-and so, in Cavers' view should be looking to Illinois law because
Illinois does have such an interest-to apply an Illinois statute to a situation
where the Illinois Legislature has determined that the statute should not be
applied. And, as regards the sensible allocation of rulemaking responsibility
among the states, once the Wisconsin court has determined that this case is the
177. See Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel Co., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
178. Cf. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968).
179. If the injured plaintiff were a Wisconsin resident, a false conflict would still be
presented, because Illinois, as the "place of acting," would be interested in implementing the
admonitory policy reflected in its law. See notes 99-101 and accompanying text supra. Presum-
ably only the chain's taverns in Illinois would be insured against this kind of liability, and in any
event, the liability here would be charged to the chain's Illinois loss experience.
180. American Perspective, supra note 20, at 134.
181. Id.
182. In the author's view, the forum should look to the other state's choice-of-law rules as
well. See Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 5, at 95-102.
183. See Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post, 43 IIl. 2d 1, 7,248 N.E.2d 657, 660 (1969).
184. If it did, it would probably apply it infavor of anlllinois residentinjuredthere, Conklin
v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968), assuming, as is likely, that the tavern's
operations were conducted close enough to the Wisconsin border so that the application of
Wisconsin law was foreseeable and insurable. SeeBernhardv. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d215,546
P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976).
185. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CoNFLicr OF LAWS 246 (1971).
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responsibility of Illinois, it is utterly incongruous for it to apply an Illinois
statute which the Illinois Legislature has directed shall not apply to this case
that is within Illinois rulemaking responsibility.
There is little doubt that Wisconsin would notapply the Illinois statute in
the circumstances here presented, or that an American court, once the concept
of functionally restrictive substantive rules is properly understood, would
respect a functionally restrictive limitation contained in a statute of another
state. 186 The American court will do so, notwithstanding a general reluctance
to take into account another state's conflicts law. But why, it may be asked,
would there be this difference? In the first place, too much significance
should not be attached to the forum's failure to look to the conflicts law of the
other involved state. Its failure to do so may simply be because it has been
conditioned by the "renvoi hang-up" not to look to another state's conflicts
law. More specifically, the only effect of its failure to do so will be that it must
make a choice-of-law decision. Where the forum has an interest in applying
its own law, experience indicates that it will usually do so. 117 This assumes
that the other state is following a policy-centered approach, which would be
the only circumstance in which it conflicts law would look to the substantive
law of the forum. One will search in vain for a case in which a, court,
committed to a policy-centered approach, has applied the law of another state
in preference to its own when there was a clear indication that if the case had
been brought in the courts of another state, those courts would have decided
the case in accordance with the substantive law of the forum. In short, among
policy-centered courts, the practical effect of the failure to take account of the
other state's conflicts law has not resulted in the application of that state's
substantive law in preference to the law of the forum, where, if the case had
been brought in the courts of the other state, those courts themselves would
have looked to the substantive law of the forum. This failure has merely
resulted in needless choice-of-law decisions in cases where, if the forum had
186. Research has uncovered no cases in which this question was squarely presented. In
Griggs v. Riley, 489 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. App. 1972), two residents of Illinois, a guest statute state,
were involved in an accident in Missouri. Missouri did not have a guest statute. In holding that the
Illinois guest statute should not be applied, the Missouri court found that Illinois, if the case had
been brought there, would not have applied the Illinois guest statute. The court decided, perhaps
questionably, that the older cases applying the law of the "place of the wrong" would still be
followed, notwithstanding the abandonment of that rule in other tort cases. Id. at 474. It
concluded: "We are not constrained to afford Illinois hosts greater protection than Illinois courts
would afford them, particularly when to do so conflicts with the policy of this state." Id. For
criticism of the Missouri court's interpretation of Illinois conflicts law with respect to the
application of its guest statute to situations containing a foreign element, see Haworth, The
Mirror Image Conflicts Case, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 16-17. In any event, the Missouri court was
not treating the Illinois guest statute as containing a functionally restrictive limitation, but was
apparently surmounting the "renvoi hang-up" and looking to Illinois conflicts law to determine
how the courts .of Illinois would have decided this case if it had been brought there.
187. See Sedler, Weintraub's Commentary on the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Torts,
57 IowA L. REV. 1229, 1234 (1972).
RESTRICTIVE RULES
looked to the "whole law" of the other state, 188 it would have found that no
conflict of laws actually existed. 189 Second, while courts may have been
conditioned by the "renvoi hang-up" to ignore the conflicts law of another
state, looking to those conflicts laws is, as De Nova has pointed out, very
different from looking to limitations imposed by the legislature when enacting
the law in question. 19 While a court of one state may be willing to ignore the
conflicts law that has been made by the courts of another state, since it has
been conditioned as a matter of its internal law of court-legislature relations to
take account of functionally substantive restrictions contained in statutes
enacted by its own legislature, it is also likely to show respect for a similar
restriction contained in statutes enacted by the legislature of another state. It
will not be "more Roman than the Romans," at least where a legislative
determination is involved, and will not apply foreign law that does not
"want" to be applied. Thus, it seems fairly clear that the forum will take
account of a functionally restrictive substantive limitation contained in the
statute of another state. When it does so, it may find as a result that there is no
conflict of laws, just as there will not be a conflict of laws when the
purportedly applicable statute of the forum is found to contain such a
restriction. 191
At the same time it is highly unlikely that, for the purpose of determining
whether a conflict of laws actually exists, the forum court would construe a
statute of another state as constituting a functionally restrictive substantive
rule, unless the functionally restrictive limitation was expressly contained in
the statute itself, or, as in the Illinois-Wisconsin dram shop example, the
functionally restrictive nature of the statute has already been determined by
the courts of the enacting state as a matter of demonstrable legislative
intention. In other words, it does not seem probable that the forum court
would find that, as a matter of demonstrable legislative intention, the statute
of another state constitutes a functionally restrictive substantive rule inapplic-
able to the situation containing a foreign element. 192 Since such a finding
188. That is, if the forum had looked to the other state's conflicts law as well as its
substantive law. See generally Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33
YALE L.J. 457 (1924).
189. See, e.g., Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
The court held in Haumschild that Wisconsin law would apply as the law of the marital domicile
on the issue of spousal immunity where spouses domiciled in Wisconsin, which did not recognize
spousal immunity, were involved in an accident in California, which at that time did. Id. at 131-37,
95 N.W.2d at 815-18. Two justices, concurring in the result, argued that under California conflicts
law, a California court would look to Wisconsin substantive law on the question. Id. at 142-45,95
N.W.2d at 820-22.
190. See notes 174-75 and accompanying text supra.
191. See notes 166-68 and accompanying text supra.
192. In his discussion of the Kaufman example, Professor De Nova maintains that the New
York court should hold that the Oregon rule of charitable immunity is not applicable to a case
involving a New York victii and a New York charity, carrying on its "good works" there,
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depends on the legislative dynamic of the particular legislature, only the
courts of the enacting state, which must regularly respond to that dynamic, are
in a position to say how it operated with respect to the statute in question. 193
This point, however, again illustrates the clear difference between the
operation of the concept of functionally restrictive substantive rules in a
system that is more or less policy-centered-where the concept is relevant
only for the purpose of determining at the outset whether a conflict of laws
actually exists-and its operation within the framework of a rule-oriented
approach-where the concept is relied upon to find "within the 'competent'
foreign law the correct rules of decision."1 94 In a rule-oriented system the
court must determine the intent of the legislature of the enacting state in regard
to the application of the statute or code provision to the situation containing a
foreign element. Since the court is not in a position to determine the
legislative dynamic, it must make the determination with reference to the
* underlying policy of the statute.195 In the American context the consideration
of whether, in light of the policy behind the statute, the legislature intended
for it to apply to a particular situation containing a foreign element is an
integral part of the choice-of-law process, which comes into play only after a
notwithstanding that the accident occurred in Oregon. See notes 63-69 and accompanying text
supra. Presumably, however, the New York court, for the purpose of determining whether a
conflict of laws actually exists, would not thus interpret the statute, unless the Oregon courts
have already done so. Nevertheless, when making the choice-of-law decision, on the assumption
that the Oregon rule of charitable immunity is not by its own force inapplicable here, the court
would look to the absence of Oregon's interest in protecting the New York charity, and, in light of
New York's interest in protecting the New York plaintiff, find that there was a false conflict and
apply New York law, as in Babcock
193. This principle was illustrated in Graham and Marmon. If the application of the substan-
tive law of the.other'state would be unconstitutional in the factual situation presented, however,
the forum of course must determine the constitutional question for itself. For example, in Erwin
v. Thomas, 264 Ore. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973), a Washington husband was injured in Washington
due to the negligent driving of an employee of an Oregon corporation. His wife brought suit
against the defendant in Oregon, seeking to recover for loss of her husband's consortium. Such
an action was allowed under Oregon law, but not under Washington law. The court concluded
that neither state had a real interest in applying its law on this question and then applied Oregon
law as the law of the forum. Id. at 459-61,506 P.2d at 496-97. The Washington law allowing only
the husband to recover for loss of the spouse's consortium was, however, probably violative of
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause as constituting an irrational sex-based
distinction. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Since the practice of the courts, where a benefit is given to one sex but not the other in
circumstances making the sex-based distinction unconstitutional, is generally to extend the
benefit to the members of the other sex, see, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, supra, the Oregon
court could have held that under Washington law, as constitutionally construed, the wife did have
a cause of action for loss of the husband's consortium, so that there was in reality no conflict
between Oregon and Washington law on this point. Cf. Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 197 1).
194. De Nova, Conflict of Laws, supra note 19, at 1571.
195. English courts, for example, do not generally look to legislative history in determining
questions of statutory construction, and it is apparently of limited significance in the process of
code interpretation in most European countries.
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conflict of laws is found to exist. In any event, an American court should only
find that a statute of another state constitutes a functionally restrictive
substantive rule when this appears by the express terms of the statute, or
where the statute has been so construed by the courts of the enacting state.
Since both the potentially applicable statute of the forum and the
potentially applicable statute of the other involved state must be examined to
determine whether they constitute functionally restrictive substantive rules,
there is theoretically the possibility of a gap. This might occur in a situation
where the matter in question is regulated by statute, and both the statute of the
forum and of the other involved state are found to constitute functionally
restrictive substantive rules, inapplicable to this particular case. In practice,
however, this is highly unlikely to occur. For example, where the wrongful
death act of either or both the victim's or defendant's home state is construed
as not being applicable extraterritorially, suit can always be brought under the
wrongful death act of the state of injury. The statute of the state of the injury
will not, and probably constitutionally cannot, be construed as being inapplic-
able by its own force where one or both parties are nonresidents. 196 But a gap
could occur where both the statute of the forum and of the other involved state
create substantially similar substantive rights, but because of strictures
against extraterritorial application, both are inapplicable unless all the legally
significant facts giving rise to the plaintiff's claim occurred within the borders
of the enacting state. This was the problem in Waynick v. Chicago's Last
Department Store,19 7 which again involved the extraterritorial application of
dram shop acts. The liquor was sold to the intoxicated driver in Illinois and the
resulting accident occurred in Michigan, injuring Michigan plaintiffs. Suit
was brought against the tavern in Illinois. Both statutes were construed as
being inapplicable unless both the sale of liquor and the resulting harm
occurred within the borders of the enacting state, and thus both constituted
functionally restrictive substantive rules, inapplicable to this situation con-
taining a foreign element. Observing that the law, like nature, "abhors a
vacuum," the court found that in Michigan, the place of injury, there was a
common law right to recovery. 198 In this kind of case, commentators
operating within a rule-oriented framework have argued that the forum
cannot accept the functionally restrictive nature of the law of the state chosen
by its choice-of-law rule. Instead, it must apply the law that the courts of that
196. To deny recovery under the forum's wrongful death act to a nonresident injured in the
forum solely because of the fact of nonresidency (as opposed to holding, for example, that
recovery must be under the statute of the party's home state, if it is applicable), would probably
be a denial of equal protection as well as being violative of the comity clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 2.
197. 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S: 903 (1960).
198. The dissent found this conclusion unsupported by Michigan case law. Id. at 326-27.
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state would apply to a purely domestic case, i.e., a case containing no foreign
elements. 199 Thus, here they would argue that Illinois should apply the dram
shop act of Michigan, since Michigan was the "place of the wrong" within
the meaning of Illinois' then-existing choice-of-law rule. But, from the
standpoint of a policy-centered court, the proper approach would be simply to
hold that the plaintiff is entitled to recover because there is no conflict of
policies between the laws of the two involved states. Consequently, the forum
can fashion a rule of decision for this case based on the laws of both states.
Bot states have an interest in seeing that the plaintiff recovers here. Illinois
desires to regulate the conduct of the tavernkeeper within its borders, while
Michigan wants to provide compensation for its residents injured by the
negligence of an intoxicated driver in Michigan, and the substantive laws of
both states provide for such recovery. Since the defendant would be liable
under the dram shop act if both the sale and injury occurred in either state,20
the result should be no different where the sale occurred in one and the injury
occurred in another. In theoretical terms, looking to both Illinois and
Michigan law is explained by Cook's theory of the local law, 201 under which
the forum, since it is using foreign law only as a model for the rule of decision
in the case, can look to foreign law in part. 2°2 Here, the forum state, Illinois,
would fashion a rule of decision for the case using Illinois law as a model
insofar as it made the sale of liquor resulting in intoxication wrongful and
actionable, and Michigan law as a model insofar as it made the seller
responsible in damages to the injured party for the harm resulting from the
intoxication. As this example indicates, the gap problem will rarely occur, if
at all, and can be easily surmounted by fashioning a rule of decision looking to
both statutes and to the common policy that they reflect.
CONCLUSION
The concept of functionally restrictive substantive rules has been developed
on the Continent and elsewhere as a means of "finding within the 'competent'
foreign law the correct rules of decision." 2 3 While introducing considera-
tions of policy into the framework of a rule-oriented approach to choice-of-
law "by the back door," 20 4 it does so, in theory at least, only for the purpose
of giving full effect to the forum's choice-of-law rule, that is, to insure that the
forum is applying the properly applicable law of the system that it has chosen.
199. See notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra.
200. Because of the proximity of the tavern to Michigan, Michigan law was foreseeable and
insurable. See also Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215
(1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976).
201. See note 188 supra.
202. See Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 5, at 133-34.
203. See text accompanying note 194 supra.
204. See text accompanying notes 56-69 supra.
RESTRICTIVE RULES
Within this framework, however, recognition of the concept of functionally
restrictive substantive rules may result in the absence of a conflict of laws:
when the purportedly applicable rule of one state is functionally restricted so
as to be inapplicable to a situation containing a foreign element, there will be
no conflict of laws if the residually applicable rule of that state and the
applicable rule of the other state do not produce a different result. 205
It is the matter of the absence of a conflict of laws that indicates the utility
of this concept in the American context, where choice-of-law is by and large
policy-centered rather than rule-oriented. Functionally restrictive substantive
rules necessarily do exist, even if they are not recognized by the name, and the
concept of functionally restrictive substantive rules, as developed on the
Continent and elsewhere, can be adapted for use in the American context to
point up the absence of conflict between the substantive laws of the involved
states. This will avoid unnecessary and possibily even unsound choice-of-law
decisions. 206 For these purposes, a functionally restrictive substantive rule
has been defined in this Article as a statutory rule that within itself, either by
its own terms, or as a matter of demonstrable legislative intention, as
determined by the courts of the enacting state, precludes its application to
certain situations containing a foreign element. Where a purportedly applic-
able statute is construed as constituting a functionally restrictive substantive
rule, there will frequently be no conflict of laws because the residually
applicable rule of that state and the applicable rule of the other state do not
produce a different result, or because, in an area generally regulated by
statute, only one of the statutes can be applicable. This Article has attempted
to illustrate the operation of this concept, as adapted for use in the American
context, and to show that the concept may have considerable utility in
answering the threshold question "Is there a conflict of laws?"
205. See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
206. For example, Wisconsin, which did not have a dram shop act, would allow suit under
the Illinois dram shop act, which the Illinois court held was by its own force inapplicable to
accidents occurring outside of Illinois.
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